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Abstract: During the last five years the CJEU had to decide on more than 50 pre-
liminary references in the area of consumer contract law. As a consequence there
are far more than 100 decisions available which represent the increasingly con-
crete basis for a European contract law. Particularly striking is the rising number
of questions referred to the CJEU by the new Member States. With regard to
quantity, two fields stand out: legal conflicts about financial services of all kinds
and about passenger rights. Since the CJEU has developed independent dog-
matics for some areas of contract law, it might be necessary to rethink legal
categories on the national level.
Résumé: Durant les cinq dernières années, la CJUE a dû répondre à plus de
50 questions préjudicielles dans le domaine du droit des contrats de consomma-
tion. En conséquence, il y a bien plus de 100 décisions disponibles qui représen-
tent une base concrète croissante pour un droit européen des contrats. L’accrois-
sement du nombre de questions adressées à la CJUE par les nouveaux Etats
membres est particulièrement frappant. Quantitativement, deux domaines se
distinguent : les conflits juridiques relatifs aux services financiers de toutes sortes
et ceux relatifs aux droits des passagers. Comme la CJUE a développé des inter-
Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz: European University Institute, Department of Law, Via Boccac-
cio 121, 50133 Florence, Italy, E ˗ Mail: Hans.Micklitz@EUI.eu
Betül Kas: PhD Researcher, European University Institute, Department of Law, Via Boccaccio 121,
50133 Florence, Italy, E ˗ Mail: Betul.Kas@EUI.eu
ERCL 2014; 10(2): 189–257
prétations propres dans quelques domaines du droit des contrats, il pourrait être
nécessaire de repenser les catégories juridiques au niveau national.
Zusammenfassung: In den letzten fünf Jahren hatte der EuGH mehr als 50 Vorla-
geverfahren zu entscheiden. Per dato liegen damit weit mehr als 100 Entschei-
dungen vor, die in immer dichterer Form die Grundlagen für ein europäisches
Vertragsrecht konkretisieren. Auffällig ist die steigende Zahl von Vorlagen aus
den neuen Mitgliedstaaten. In der Sache dominieren in quantitativer Hinsicht
zwei Bereiche: rechtliche Auseinandersetzungen um Finanzdienstleistungen jed-
weder Art und das Passagier- bzw. Reiserecht. Für Teilbereiche des Vertragsrechts
entwickelt der EuGH eine eigenständige Dogmatik, die ein Überdenken nationaler
rechtlicher Kategorien notwendig macht.
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Part II 
II Travel law
1 Passenger rights in air traffic (case 173/07 Emirates Airlines;
case 549/07Wallentin-Hermann; case 301/08 Bogiatzi;
joined cases 402/07 and 432/07 Sturgeon and Others;
case 63/09Walz; case 294/10 Eglītis and Ratnieks;
case 83/10 Sousa Rodríguez and Others; case 22/11 Finnair;
case 321/11 Rodríguez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo
Varela-Villamor; joined cases 581/10 and 629/10 Nelson and
Others; case 139/11 Cuadrench Moré; case 12/11McDonagh;
case 11/11 Folkerts)
The case-law of the CJEU on passenger rights in air traffic has experienced a boom
in the last five years. This is not only due to the effects of liberalisation and the
increased mobility on the air transport market, but results also from the uncertainty
of national courts in applying central concepts of the Regulation (EC) No 261/20041
which entered into force on 17 February 2005. The Regulation raises a number of
legal questions which lead to differences in interpretation between air passengers
and air carriers. The legal disputes raise questions regarding the relationship
between European and international provisions. It is the role of the CJEU to bring
clarity and structure into the diffuse legal situation. The case-law is characterised
by the aim of the Regulation to ensure a high level of consumer protection. The CJEU
has clarified, among other matters, the scope of application of the Regulation, the
distinction between ‘cancellation’ and ‘delay’, the concept of ‘denied boarding’, the
event of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and the concept of ‘further compensation’.
By way of the case-law of the CJEU, the area of passenger rights is developing into a
self-standing branch of law.2 Because of the high number of references for a
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1 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and repealing Regulation (EEC)
No 295/91,OJEC 2004 L46/1.
2 See for an overall view including the case-law of the CJEU, S. Bergmann, ‘Verbraucherschutz
im Bereich Tourismus und Freizeitʼ, in M. Tamm and K. Tonner (eds), Verbraucherrecht (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2012) paragraphs 267–298; K. Tonner, ‘Nach § 651: Personen-Beförderungsver-
trag, III Luftbeförderungʼ, in F.J. Säcker et al (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Band 4
preliminary ruling, the integration in the case-law will be found at the end of the
section.
a) Right to compensation in the event of the cancellation of a return flight from
a third country by a non-European carrier (case 173/07 Emirates Airlines)
aa) Facts
The German Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main asked whether the term ‘flight’
encompassed both the outward and return flight in accordance with Article 3(1)(a)
of Regulation 261/04. If so, the Regulation had to be applied to passengers who
have departed from an airport located in the territory of a Member State and
return to that airport with a flight from a third country. The national court also
asked whether the fact that the outward and return flights are the subject of a
single booking affects the interpretation of that provision.
In this dispute the passenger booked a flight from Düsseldorf (Germany) to
Manila (Philippines) with a non-European carrier. Because of a cancellation the
passenger could depart for his return flight only two days later. The Amtsgericht
Frankfurt am Main upheld the passengers’ claim for compensation. The carrier
appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, submitting that the out-
ward and return flights were to be regarded as two separate flights and that the
return flight, which had not departed in a Member State but in Manila, did not fall
within the scope of the Regulation in accordance with Article 3(1)(a). Moreover
the carrier was not a ‘Community carrier’ in accordance with Article 3(1)(b).
bb) Main reasoning
Following the opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, the CJEU ruled that Ar-
ticle 3(1)(a) does not apply to the case of an outward and return journey in which
passengers travel back to the original airport in a Member State from a third-
country airport. The CJEU defined the term ‘flight’ as a single air transport
operation performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary.3 Under the provi-
sions and objectives of the Regulation a distinction had to be made between the
parts ‘outward flight’ and ‘return flight’: a ‘flight’ could not be regarded as an
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(6th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2012) paragraphs 18–51; see also J. Janköster, Fluggastrechte im inter-
nationalen Luftverkehr (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009).
3 Case 173/07 Emirates Airlines – Direktion für Deutschland v Diether Schenkel [2008] ECR I-05237
(CJEU), para 40.
‘outward and return journey’.4 Otherwise passengers on the same flight departing
from a third country would be treated differently depending on whether they
departed on their outward flight from a Member State or not.5 The term ‘journey’
does not appear in the wording of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation 261/04 and has no
effect on the interpretation of that provision.6 In accordance with Article 17, the
Community legislature would possibly consider for the future to extend the scope
of the Regulation to passengers on flights from a non-member country to a
Member State operated by non-European carriers.7 The fact that the outward and
return flights are the subject of a single booking has no influence on that conclu-
sion.8
b) Cancellation of a flight due to technical problems
(case 549/07Wallentin-Hermann)
aa) Facts
The reference for a preliminary ruling of the Austrian Handelsgericht Wien
concerned the interpretation of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in
Article 5(3) of Regulation 261/04. The national court asked whether the concept of
‘extraordinary circumstances’ covers technical problems in an aircraft and
whether the grounds of exemption must be interpreted in accordance with the
provisions of the Montreal Convention. Moreover it was questioned whether the
frequency of the technical problems which cause flight cancellations precludes
them from being covered by ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and whether ‘all
reasonable measures’ have been taken if the air carrier has met the minimum
legal requirements with regard to maintenance work.
The family booked a flight from Vienna (Austria) to Brindisi (Italy). Five
minutes before the scheduled departure time in Vienna the family was informed
that their flight had been cancelled. The cancellation resulted from a complex
engine defect in the turbine which had been discovered the day before during a
check. The family reached its final destination Brindisi three hours and 50 min-
utes later than scheduled. The Austrian Bezirksgericht für Handelssachen Wien
upheld the claim for compensation on the ground that the technical defects were
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4 Case 173/07, n 3 above, paragraphs 32–37.
5 Case 173/07, n 3 above, paragraphs 38–39.
6 Case 173/07, n 3 above, paragraph 41.
7 Case 173/07, n 3 above, paragraphs 48, 49.
8 Case 173/07, n 3 above, paragraphs 50–52.
not covered by the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ provided for in Article 5(3) of
Regulation 261/04. The air carrier lodged an appeal.
bb) Main reasoning
The derogation from the passengers’ right to compensation in the case of ‘extra-
ordinary circumstances’ in Article 5(3) has to be interpreted strictly.9 The exam-
ples of events in recital 14 are not to be regarded themselves as extraordinary
circumstances, but they may produce such circumstances.10 The circumstances
surrounding ‘unexpected flight safety shortcomings’ can be characterised as
‘extraordinary’ if that event is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of
the air carrier concerned and is beyond the actual control of that carrier on
account of its nature or origin.11 In the light of the specific conditions of carriage
by air and the degree of technological sophistication of aircraft, air carriers are
confronted as a matter of course with various technical problems.12 In general,
technical problems which come to light during maintenance of aircraft or on
account of failure to carry out such maintenance cannot constitute ‘extraordinary
circumstances’.13 Neither is the frequency of the technical problems experienced
by an air carrier a factor from which the presence or absence of ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ can be concluded.14 The Montreal Convention15 is not decisive for
the interpretation of the grounds of exemption under the Regulation 261/04 since
it does not refer to ‘extraordinary circumstances’. Moreover, Article 19 of the
Montreal Convention governs only the conditions for compensation for delayed
flights by way of redress on an individual basis, while Article 5(3) of the Regula-
tion provides for standardised and immediate compensatory measures in case of
flight cancellations.16 With regard to the last question of the referring court, the
CJEU ruled that in the case of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ the air carrier must
establish that, even if it had deployed all its resources in terms of staff or
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9 Case 549/07 Friederike Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia – Linee Aeree Italiane SpA [2008] ECR
I-11061 (CJEU), paragraph 20.
10 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraphs 21, 22.
11 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 23.
12 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 24.
13 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 25.
14 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 37.
15 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, con-
cluded in Montreal on 28 May 1999, was signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999
and approved on its behalf by Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001, OJEC 2001 L194/38.
That Convention entered into force so far as concerns the Community on 28 June 2004.
16 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraphs 30–33.
equipment and the financial means at its disposal, it would not have been able to
avoid the cancellation of the flight.17 It is not sufficient that the air carrier has
complied with the minimum rules on maintenance.18
c) Time-limits for actions for damages under Regulation (EC) No 2027/97
19
(case 301/08 Bogiatzi)
aa) Facts
The Luxembourgian Cour de cassation asked the CJEU whether the time-limit in
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention20 is applicable even though Regulation 2027/
97 makes no express provision to that effect. If the answer is in the affirmative, it
was questioned whether that time-limit can be suspended, interrupted or waived.
Five years after the passenger suffered a fall on the tarmac at Luxembourg
airport she brought proceedings for damages against Deutscher Luftpool Rück-
versicherungsgemeinschaft (German association of aviation insurers) and the air
carrier before the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg. The national court
dismissed the action on the basis of the two-year limitation period provided for in
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. The inadmissibility of the claim was con-
firmed on appeal and the passenger appealed on a point of law to the Cour de
cassation.
bb) Main reasoning
Following the opinion of the Advocate-General Mazák, the Commission and the
French Government, the CJEUmade clear at the outset that the Court under Article
267 TFEU does not have jurisdiction to interpret the Warsaw Convention.21 The
Regulation 2027/97 does not preclude the application of Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention. The Regulation 2027/97 is intended to improve the level of protection
for passengers involved in air accidents on flights between Member States by the
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17 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 41.
18 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 43.
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in the event of
accidents,OJEC 1997 L285/1.
20 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as amended by the four additional protocols signed at
Montreal on 25 September 1975.
21 Case 301/08 Irène Bogiatzi, married name Ventouras v Deutscher Luftpool and Others [2009]
ECR I-10185 (CJEU), paragraph 34.
introduction of provisions to increase a number of the limits of liability laid down
by the Warsaw Convention.22 In accordance with recitals 2 and 4 in the preamble
and Article 2(2) of the Regulation, the protection of the Regulation and the protec-
tion of the Convention have to be regarded as being complementary and equiva-
lent to each other where the Regulation does not preclude the application of the
Warsaw Convention in order to raise the level of protection of passengers.23 Article
29 of the Warsaw Convention simply governs a procedural rule for bringing an
action for damages in the event of an accident and is not in the category of
provisions whose application is precluded.24 The jurisdiction of the CJEU does not
cover the other question of the national court whether the time-limit laid down in
Article 29 of the Convention could be suspended, interrupted or waived.25
d) Right to compensation in the event of delayed flights under Article 7 of
Regulation 261/04 (joined cases 402/07 and 432/07 Sturgeon and Others)
aa) Facts
The references for a preliminary ruling of the German Bundesgerichtshof and the
Austrian Handelsgericht Wien concern the distinction between the notions of
‘cancellation’ and ‘delay’ in Regulation 261/04. The CJEU took position with
regard to the questions whether a long delay of a flight can be regarded as a
cancellation and whether the passengers of delayed flights also have a right to
compensation. The Handelsgericht Wien also asked whether a technical problem
is covered by the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
In both cases the passengers have been told shortly before the departure that
their flight has been cancelled. The passengers reached their final destination
more than 22 hours after the time of arrival originally scheduled and brought
actions against the air carriers claiming compensation for the cancellation of their
flight. The air carriers contested the claim arguing that there had been only a
delay.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU ruled that the duration of the delay is not sufficient to regard a flight as
cancelled if the flight is operated in accordance with the original planning. But if
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22 Case 301/08, n 21 above, paragraphs 41, 42.
23 Case 301/08, n 21 above, paragraph 43.
24 Case 301/08, n 21 above, paragraph 44.
25 Case 301/08, n 21 above, paragraph 46.
the air carrier arranges for the passengers to be carried after the scheduled
departure time on another flight, that means a flight whose original planning is
different from that of the flight for which the booking was actually made by the
passengers, it is possible, as a rule, to conclude that there is a cancellation.26
However, passengers whose flights are delayed may rely on the right to compen-
sation laid down in Article 7 of Regulation 261/04 when they reach their final
destination three hours or more after the scheduled time of arrival. Passengers
affected by a flight delay suffer similar damage, consisting in a loss of time, and
thus find themselves in comparable situations as passengers whose flight has
been cancelled. Specifically, passengers of a flight cancelled at the very last
moment are afforded under Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation 261/04 the right to
compensation even where the carrier re-routes them to another flight when they
suffer a loss of time of at least three hours in relation to the time of arrival
originally scheduled. In accordance with the principle of equal treatment it
cannot be justified to treat passengers of delayed flights differently when they
reach their final destination with a delay of three hours or more.27 The interests of
air carriers are protected because the compensation may be reduced by 50% if the
conditions laid down in Article 7(2)(c) of the Regulation are met,28 the air carrier is
released from its obligation in the case of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under
Article 5(3) of the Regulation29 and Article 13 provides for the air carriers’ rights to
seek compensation from any person who caused the damage, including third
parties.30 Referring to its decision in Wallentin-Hermann31 the CJEU states that, as
in the case of a cancellation, a technical problem which leads to a delay is not
covered by the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under Article 5(3), unless
that problem stems from events which, by their nature or origin, are not inherent
in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier and are beyond its actual
control.32
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26 Joined cases 402/07 Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v Condor
Flugdienst GmbH and 432/07 Stefan Böck and Cornelia Lepuschitz v Air France SA [2009] ECR
I-10923 (CJEU), paragraphs 34–36.
27 Joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above, paragraphs 53–61.
28 Joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above, paragraph 63.
29 Joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above, paragraph 67.
30 Joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above, paragraph 68.
31 Case 549/07, n 9 above, paragraph 34.
32 Joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above, paragraphs 70, 71.
e) Claim for compensation of material and non-material damage resulting
from the loss of baggage under Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention
(case 63/09Walz)
aa) Facts
The Spainish Juzgado de lo Mercantil n°4 de Barcelona asked the CJEU whether
the limit of liability referred to in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention includes
both material damage and non-material damage resulting from the loss of bag-
gage.
The passenger brought an action against the air carrier claiming total da-
mages of EUR 3,200 for the loss of his baggage. In this regard he claims for
material and non-material damage. In accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation
2027/97, the liability in respect of baggage is governed by the Montreal Conven-
tion which provides in Article 22(2) a limit of 1,000 Special Drawing Rights in the
case of destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage.
bb) Main reasoning
In accordance with Advocate-General Mazák the CJEU concluded that the concept
of ‘damage’ in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention includes both material and
non-material damage and that the limit of liability is an absolute limit. Since there
is no given definition, the terms ‘préjudice‘ and ‘dommage’ used in the French-
language version of the Convention for the term damage must be given a uniform
and autonomous interpretation in accordance with the rules of interpretation of
international law.33 It follows from the ordinary meaning of the term ‘damage’,
that it must be construed as including both material and non‑material damage.34
That conclusion is supported by the objectives of the Montreal Convention to lay
down a system of strict liability for air carriers with regard, more specifically, to
damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of, or damage to, checked
baggage under Article 17(2) of the Convention.35 In accordance with the fifth
recital in the preamble to the Convention, an ‘equitable balance of interests’must
be maintained, in particular as regards the interests of air carriers and of passen-
gers.36 Clear limits on compensation are required which, regardless of the nature
of the damage caused to that passenger, relate to the total damage sustained by
each passenger in the various situations in which a carrier is held liable pursuant
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33 Case 63/09AxelWalz v Clickair SA [2010] ECR I-04239 (CJEU), paragraphs 21, 22.
34 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraphs 28, 29.
35 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraphs 30–32.
36 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraph 33.
to Chapter III.37 A limitation of the liability so designed enables passengers to be
compensated easily and swiftly, yet without imposing a very heavy burden of
damages on air carriers, which would be difficult to determine and to calculate,
and would be liable to undermine the economic activity of those carriers.38 That
interpretation is confirmed by Article 22(2) which provides that a passenger may
make a special declaration of interest at the time when the checked baggage is
handed over to the carrier.39
f) Reasonable measures under Article 5(3) of Regulation 261/04 to avoid a
cancellation of a flight (case 294/10 Eglītis and Ratnieks)
aa) Facts
The Latvian Augstākās Tiesas Senāts asked whether under Article 5(3) of Regula-
tion 261/04 an air carrier has an obligation, in respect of the ‘reasonable mea-
sures’, to organise its resources in good time in order to provide a certain
minimum reserve time after the scheduled departure time, so as to be able, if
possible, to operate the flight after the extraordinary circumstances have come to
an end. Moreover it was questioned whether that ‘reserve time’ may be deter-
mined with reference to Article 6(1) of the Regulation.
On the evening of 14 July 2006, Swedish air space in the Malmö region was
closed as a result of failures in the power supply. After the passengers of a flight
from Copenhagen (Denmark) to Riga (Latvia) boarded the aeroplane they had to
wait there for a little more than two hours until the flight was cancelled. The
Latvian courts concluded that the air carrier was not obliged to pay compensation
since the cancellation occurred under extraordinary circumstances. The appel-
lants submitted on the contrary that the reason for the cancellation was the
permitted working time for the crew which was insufficient for the flight operated
with delay.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU linked its decision to that in Wallentin-Hermann40 and ruled that a
reasonable air carrier must organise its resources in good time to provide for some
reserve time, so as to be able, if possible, to operate that flight once the extra-
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37 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraphs 34, 35.
38 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraph 36.
39 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraph 38.
40 Case 549/07, n 9 above.
ordinary circumstances have come to an end. If, in such a situation, an air carrier
does not, however, have any reserve time, it cannot be concluded that it has taken
all reasonable measures as required in Article 5(3).41 There is not, however, an
obligation to provide, generally and without distinction, for a minimum reserve
time applicable in the same way to all air carriers in situations where extraordin-
ary circumstances arise. It is up to the national court to ascertain, in a flexible
way and taking into account the circumstances of the particular case, whether all
appropriate measures which at the time of the occurrence of the extraordinary
circumstances were in particular technically and economically viable have been
taken.42 The assessment of the reasonable nature of the measures taken to provide
for a reserve time must be carried out not with regard to the delay in relation to
the scheduled departure time, but taking account of the delay that may exist
at the end of the operated flight so as to take account of the secondary risks.43
Article 6(1) is not applicable when assessing the reasonable nature of the mea-
sures in the event of extraordinary circumstances.44
g) Meaning of the terms ‘cancellation’ and ‘further compensation’ under
Regulation 261/04 (case 83/10 Sousa Rodríguez and Others)
aa) Facts
The Spainish Juzgado de lo Mercantil n°1 de Pontevedra asked whether the term
‘cancellation’ in Article 2(l) of Regulation 261/04 includes the case in which the
aeroplane takes off but is forced to return to the airport of departure because of a
technical failure. Moreover the national court asked whether the air carrier under
Article 12 is liable for all types of damage, including non-material damage, arising
from the breach of a contract of carriage by air under national law or whether only
damage caused by the air carriers’ failure to comply with its duties to provide care
and assistance under Article 8 or 9 is covered.
In the dispute at hand the applicants booked an Air France flight from Paris
(France) to Vigo (Spain). The flight took off as planned, but after a few minutes
had to return to the airport of departure because of a technical problem. With the
exception of one passenger, none of the passengers of the flight received any
assistance from the air carrier.
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41 Case 294/10 Andrejs Eglītis and Edvards Ratnieks v Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas ministrija
[2011] ECR I-03983 (CJEU), paragraph 28.
42 Case 294/10, n 41 above, paragraphs 29–31.
43 Case 294/10, n 41 above, paragraphs 32–34.
44 Case 294/10, n 41 above, paragraph 35.
bb) Main reasoning
Contrary to the opinion of the French Government and the United Kingdom, the
CJEU concludes in accordance with the opinion of the Advocate-General Sharp-
ston that the term ‘cancellation’ in Article 2(l) of the Regulation also covers the
case in which an aeroplane takes off but subsequently returns to the airport of
departure and the flight does not proceed further but the passengers are trans-
ferred to other independently planned flights. The reasons for the return to the
airport of departure are irrelevant for the definition of the term ‘cancellation’ and
assume relevance only for the assessment whether, depending on the circum-
stances, there had been ‘extraordinary circumstances which could not have been
avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken’ within the meaning of
Article 5(3).45 Referring to IATA and ELFAA46 the CJEU elaborates that Article 12
allows the national courts to order the air carrier to compensate loss arising from
breach of the contract of carriage by air on a legal basis other than Regulation
261/04, in particular, under the conditions provided for by the Montreal Conven-
tion and national law.47 As already specified in Walz,48 the term ‘damages’ in
Chapter III of the Montreal Convention includes both material and non‑material
damage.49 The CJEU concludes that the air passengers’ claims based on the rights
conferred on them by Regulation 261/04, such as those set out in Article 8 and
Article 9, cannot be considered as falling within ‘further’ compensation under
Article 12. When a carrier fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 8 and Article 9,
passengers are justified in claiming a right to compensation on the basis of the
factors set out in those articles.50 Advocate-General Sharpston pointed out that
the duty to pay compensation and the duty to provide care and assistance are
concurrent and cumulative. The obligation to provide care and assistance would
be nugatory if the air carrier could escape it by offsetting it against the duty to pay
compensation.51 The Advocate-General and the CJEU agree in that Regulation 261/
04 does not preclude the award of compensation in respect of a failure to fulfil the
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45 Case 83/10 Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v Air France SA [2011] ECR I-09469 (CJEU),
paragraphs 26–34.
46 Case 344/04 The Queen, on the application of International Air Transport Association and
European Low Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport [2006] ECR I-403 (CJEU),
paragraph 47.
47 Case 83/10, n 45 above, paragraphs 37–40.
48 Case 63/09, n 33 above, paragraph 29.
49 Case 83/10, n 45 above, paragraph 41.
50 Case 83/10, n 45 above, paragraphs 42–44.
51 AG Sharpston, opinion of 28 June 2011 – case 83/10, n 45 above, paragraph 64.
obligations provided for by Article 8 and Article 9 therein, if those provisions are
not invoked by the air passengers.52
h) Denied boarding due to the rescheduling of flights following a strike by
airport staff (case 22/11 Finnair)
aa) Facts
The Finnish Korkein oikeus asked the CJEU whether the concept of ‘denied
boarding’, within the meaning of Article 2(j) and Article 4, covers only denied
boarding caused by overbooking or whether it also includes other situations.
Furthermore the national court asked whether the occurrence of ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ resulting in an air carrier rescheduling flights after those circum-
stances occurred can give grounds for denying boarding to a passenger on one of
those later flights and for exempting that carrier from its obligation, under Article
4(3) of Regulation 261/04, to compensate that passenger.
Following a strike by airport staff the flight from Barcelona (Spain) to Helsinki
(Finland) operated by Finnair had to be cancelled. In order to shorten the waiting
time for the air passengers, the air carrier decided to reschedule subsequent
flights for the next days. Due to the rescheduling, the applicant, who had duly
presented himself for boarding, could depart to Helsinki only nine hours later on
a special flight. The applicant claimed for compensation under Article 7(1)(b)
taking the view that he was denied boarding for no valid reason within the
meaning of Article 4 of Regulation 261/04.
bb) Main reasoning
The concept of ‘denied boarding’ is not limited to cases of overbooking but
includes also other reasons, such as operational reasons. That interpretation is
supported not only by the wording of Article 2(j) but also by the objective of the
Regulation to ensure a high level of protection for passengers. All circumstances
in which an air carrier might refuse to carry a passenger are covered. A passenger
in the situation at hand would be deprived of all protection if he would be
precluded from relying on Article 4 of the Regulation.53 According to Article 2(j),
the characterisation as ‘denied boarding’ may be precluded, for example, if the
passenger presenting himself for boarding fails to comply with the conditions laid
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down in Article 3(2) or where there are reasonable grounds to deny boarding ‘such
as reasons of health, safety or security, or inadequate travel documentation’.
However, the denied boarding in the case at hand is not comparable to the
grounds mentioned in Article 2(j) of Regulation 261/04, since the reason for the
denied boarding is not attributable to the passenger.54 The situation at hand is
comparable to an ‘initial’ overbooking, as the air carrier had reallocated the
applicant’s seat in order to transport other passengers, and therefore chose itself
between several passengers to be transported.55 Finally, the CJEU clarified that
the EU legislature did not intend that compensation under Article 4(3) may be
precluded in the case of a ‘denied boarding’ on grounds relating to the occurrence
of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.56 Consequently, an air carrier cannot be ex-
empted from its obligation to pay compensation under Article 4(3) of Regulation
261/04 on the ground that the denied boarding followed the rescheduling of the
flights as a result of ‘extraordinary circumstances’. According to Article 13, the air
carrier has the right to seek compensation from any person who has caused the
‘denied boarding’, including third parties.57
i) Right to compensation in the event of a refusal to allow boarding on
a connection flight because the air carrier mistakenly expected the
passengers not to arrive in time following the delay of the first flight
(case 321/11 Rodríguez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor)
aa) Facts
The question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Spainish Juzgado de lo
Mercantil n° 2 de Coruña was whether the concept of ‘denied boarding’ in Arti-
cle 2(j) of Regulation 261/04, read in conjunction with Article 3(2) of that Regula-
tion, includes a situation where an air carrier denies boarding on the ground that
the first flight included in the ticket has been subject to a delay and the air carrier
therefore mistakenly expected the passengers not to arrive in time for the second
flight.
The passengers bought airline tickets for the journey from Corunna (Spain) to
Santo Domingo involving two reservations on immediately connecting flights and
a single check-in. Following the delay of the first flight from Corunna to Madrid
the air carrier supposed that the two passengers would miss their connection and
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cancelled their boarding cards for the second flight. In spite of the delay both
passengers presented themselves at the departure gate in Madrid in time. The
staff of the air carrier did not, however, allow them to board on the grounds that
their seats had been allocated to other passengers. The passengers claimed for
compensation for ‘denied boarding’ pursuant to Articles 4(3) and 7(1)(c).
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU stated that the concept of ‘denied boarding’ in Article 2(j) of Regulation
261/04 is not limited to cases of overbooking but includes also situations in which
boarding is denied for other reasons, such as operational reasons. The European
Union legislature sought, by the adoption of the Regulation 261/04, to reduce the
number of passengers denied boarding against their will, which was too high at
that time. The scope of the definition of ‘denied boarding’ has been extended
compared to Article 1 of the previous Regulation 295/91/EEC58 by removing any
reference to the reason for the denial of boarding.59 Limiting the scope of ‘denied
boarding’ exclusively to cases of overbooking would be contrary to the aim
pursued by the legislature to ensure a high level of protection for passengers.60
The CJEU refused to equate the operational reasons for the denied boarding in the
case at hand, which were not attributable to the passenger, to the reasonable
grounds to deny boarding mentioned in Article 2(j) of Regulation 261/04.61 The
denial of boarding is attributable to the air carrier, which either caused the delay
to the first flight operated by it or mistakenly considered that the passengers
would not be able to present themselves in time at the departure gate of the
following flight or sold tickets for successive flights for which the time available
for catching the following flight was insufficient.62
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j) Confirmation of the right to compensation in the event of flight delays of three
hours or more (joined cases 581/10 and 629/10 Nelson and Others)
aa) Facts
The German Amtsgericht Köln (581/10) and the High Court of Justice, Queen’s
Bench Division (629/10) wanted to know, in essence, whether the CJEU confirms
its interpretation of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation 261/04 in Sturgeon63 accord-
ing to which passengers whose flights are delayed may be treated, for the
purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose
flights are cancelled and may thus rely on the right to compensation laid down in
Article 7 where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the
arrival time originally scheduled.
In the case 581/10 passengers brought an action before the Amtsgericht Köln
claiming compensation because their flight from Lagos (Nigeria) to Frankfurt am
Main (Germany) had a delay of more than 24 hours compared to the arrival time
originally scheduled. In the case 629/10 two air carriers, an international leisure
group and the International Air Transport Association requested confirmation
from the Civil Aviation Authority that it would not interpret Regulation 261/04 as
imposing an obligation on airlines to compensate their passengers in the event of
delay. The Civil Aviation Authority refused that request, stating that it was bound
to give effect to the ruling in Sturgeon. Consequently, they brought proceedings
before the referring court in order to challenge the position of the Civil Aviation
Authority.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU confirmed its decision in Sturgeon that passengers whose flights are
delayed and those whose flights are cancelled must be considered as being in
comparable situations, for the purposes of compensation under Article 7 of
Regulation 261/04, because those passengers suffer similar inconvenience,
namely, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours.64 The referring courts
had doubts with regard to the compatibility of the right to compensation in the
event of delayed flights with the conditions and limits laid down in the Montreal
Convention with regard to the right to compensation. Referring to its decisions in
IATA und ELFAA65 the CJEU stated that it does not follow from the Montreal
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Convention that it intends to shield air carriers from further measures, in particu-
lar from such measures which could redress, in a standardised and immediate
manner, the inconveniences caused by the delay.66 Article 19 of the Montreal
Convention implies that the damage arises as a result of a delay, that there is a
causal link between the delay and the damage and that the damage is individual
to passengers depending on the various losses sustained by them. This is not the
case regarding the right to compensation under the Regulation 261/04 which
constitutes a standardised measure to compensate the loss of time.67 Thus the
obligation to pay compensation in the event of a delay does not fall within the
scope of application of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention.68 A breach of the
principle of legal certainty is not given because the air carriers were able to know
their rights and obligations unequivocally since the Sturgeon-decision.69 The
financial consequences for air carriers cannot be considered disproportionate to
the aim of ensuring a higher level of protection for the air passengers.70 The CJEU
rejected the applications of the air carriers to limit the temporal effects of the
Sturgeon-decision.71
k) Time-limit for bringing actions for compensation under Articles 5 and 7
of Regulation 261/04 (case 139/11 Cuadrench Moré)
aa) Facts
The Spain Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona asked the CJEU, whether the time-
limits for bringing actions for compensation under Articles 5 and 7 of Regulation
261/04 are determined by Article 35 of the Montreal Convention or in accordance
with some other provision, particularly the national rules on the limitation of
actions.
The passenger booked a flight from Shanghai (China) to Barcelona (Spain).
Since the flight was cancelled the passenger could only depart the day after.
About three years after that event, the passenger brought an action claiming
compensation.
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bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU clarified that the time-limits for bringing actions for compensation
under Articles 5 and 7 of the Regulation are determined by the national law of
each Member State, provided that those rules observe the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.72 As the compensation measures laid down in the Regula-
tion fall outside the scope of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, the two-year
limitation period laid down in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention and in
Article 35 of the Montreal Convention is not applicable.73 That finding cannot be
disproved by the decision in Bogiatzi,74 since the Regulation 2027/97 concerns the
liability of air carriers in the event of an accident, which is hence the subject of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.75 Regulation 261/04 establishes an indepen-
dent system to redress, in a standardised and immediate manner, the damage in
cases of a delay or a cancellation which operates in addition to the Montreal
Convention.76
l) Assistance to passengers in the event of cancellation of flights because of
‘extraordinary circumstances’ as the eruption of the Icelandic volcano
Eyjafjallajökull (case 12/11McDonagh)
aa) Facts
The questions of the Irish Dublin Metropolitan District Court arose in the context
of the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull in spring 2010 which
caused the closure of airspace resulting in the cancellation of more than 100,000
flights and affecting almost 10 million air passengers. The reference for a pre-
liminary ruling concerned the question, whether this event is covered by the
notion of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ as used in Regulation 261/04, or whether
it falls within a category of events above and beyond those extraordinary circum-
stances, thus releasing the air carrier from its obligation to provide care for
passengers in accordance with Articles 5 and 9. For the first case the Irish court
wants to know further, whether the obligation to provide care must be limited, in
temporal or monetary terms. If that is not the case, the validity of the provisions is
questioned in terms of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination,
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the principle of an ‘equitable balance of interests’ enshrined in the Montreal
Convention, and Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
Following the closure of the Irish airspace as a consequence of the eruption
of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull, the flight from Faro (Portugal) to Dublin
(Ireland) was cancelled. The applicant in the case at hand was not provided with
care in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation 261/04 during the period from
17 April 2010, the original date for the return flight, to 24 April 2010, when she
actually could travel back to Dublin. The applicant claims compensation in the
amount of EUR 1,129.41, corresponding to the costs which she incurred for meals,
refreshments, accommodation and transport. The air carrier claimed that the
closure of airspace does not constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the
meaning of Regulation 261/04 but ‘super extraordinary circumstances’, releasing
it from its obligations to provide care.
bb) Main reasoning
In accordance with the opinion of Advocate-General Bot, the CJEU concluded,
that circumstances as the closure of part of the European airspace after the
eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull constitute ‘extraordinary cir-
cumstances’, which do not release the air carrier from its obligations to provide
care in accordance with Articles 5(1)(b) and 9. In accordance with everyday
language, the words ‘extraordinary circumstances’ relate to all circumstances
which are beyond the control of the air carrier, whatever the nature of those
circumstances or their gravity.77 The Regulation does not contain any separate
category of ‘particularly extraordinary circumstances’.78 To distinguish between
‘extraordinary’ and ‘particularly extraordinary’ circumstances would go against
the aim of that Regulation of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers,
because precisely those passengers who find themselves in a particularly vulner-
able state after a flight cancellation would be denied the protection of the Regula-
tion.79 According to the CJEU the wording of the Regulation contains no limita-
tion, whether temporal or monetary, of the obligations to provide care, not even
where the cancellation of the flight has been caused by extraordinary circum-
stances.80 It is precisely in situations where the waiting period occasioned by the
cancellation of a flight is particularly lengthy that it is necessary to ensure that an
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air passenger can have access to essential goods and services throughout that
period.81 The costs linked to the obligation to provide care which the air carriers
have to sustain are proportionate considering the intended high level of protec-
tion for passengers.82 Nonetheless, an air passenger may only obtain, by way of
compensation for the failure to comply with the obligation to provide care,
reimbursement of the amounts which prove necessary, appropriate and reason-
able to make up for the shortcomings in the provision of care. The assessment of
this is a matter which is for the national court.83 The validity of the obligation to
provide care has not to be assessed in the light of the principle of an ‘equitable
balance of interests’ referred to in the Montreal Convention, because these mea-
sures are not among those whose institution is governed by the Convention.84 A
breach of the principle of non-discrimination is not given because the different
provisions for the various transport sectors are justified.85 The obligations to
provide care strike a fair balance between the various fundamental rights laid
down in Articles 16, 17 and 38 of the Charter.86
m) Compensation in the event of delayed arrival at the final destination
(case 11/11 Folkerts)
aa) Facts
The German Bundesgerichtshof referred to the CJEU the question for a preliminary
ruling, whether a passenger has a right to compensation under Article 7 of
Regulation 261/04 in the case where departure of the flight was delayed for a
period which is below the limits specified in Article 6(1), but arrival at the final
destination was at least three hours later than the scheduled arrival time.87
The passenger booked a flight from Bremen (Germany) to Asunción (Para-
guay) via Paris (France) and São Paolo (Brazil). Since the flight from Bremen to
Paris took off with a delay of about two hours, the passenger missed the connect-
ing flights in Paris and São Paolo and arrived in Asunción with a delay of 11 hours
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relating to the arrival time originally scheduled. At first instance and then on
appeal, the air carrier was ordered to pay damages in the amount of EUR 600
under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 261/04. The air carrier then brought an appeal
on a point of law before the Bundesgerichtshof.
bb) Main reasoning
First of all the CJEU explained that the Regulation contemplates two different
types of flight delays, namely, first, the delay in the scheduled departure time (as
eg in Article 6) and, second, the delayed arrival at the final destination (as eg in
Article 5(1)(c) in the event of a cancellation of a flight and a re-routing).88 As
already stated in Sturgeon89 and Nelson,90 passengers whose flights have a delay
equal to or in excess of three hours are entitled to compensation.91 The delay must
be assessed, for the purposes of the compensation provided for in Article 7, in
relation to the scheduled arrival time at that destination. In the case of directly
connecting flights, the concept of ‘final destination’ is defined in Article 2(h) as
being the destination of the last flight.92 The right to compensation is not depen-
dent on the limits set out in Article 6 since that provision according to its wording
concerns only the entitlement to the measures of assistance and care provided for
in Articles 8 and 9. Otherwise the passengers arriving at their final destination
with a delay of three hours or more would, depending on whether their flights
were delayed beyond the scheduled departure time by more than the limits set
out in Article 6, be subject to an unjustified difference in treatment.93 The finan-
cial consequences for air carriers cannot be considered disproportionate to the
aim of ensuring a high level of protection for air passengers. The financial
consequences are likely to be mitigated in the light of the three factors: First of all,
there is no obligation to pay compensation in the case of extraordinary circum-
stances which could not have been avoided and which are beyond the air carrier’s
actual control. Next, Article 13 provides the possibility to seek compensation from
any person who caused the delay, including third parties. In addition, the amount
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of compensation may still be reduced by 50% in accordance with Article 7(2)(c)
where the delay is, in the case of a flight not falling under Article 7(2)(a) or (b),
less than four hours.94
2 Integration into the case-law
In the case Emirates Airlines95 the scope of application of the Regulation 261/04
was at stake. Regulation 261/04 applies to all passengers departing from an
airport located in the territory of a Member State, irrespective whether the flight is
operated by a European or non-European air carrier. Moreover, flights operated
by a European carrier and departing from a third country to an airport situated in
the territory of a Member State are covered. The question was raised whether a
non-European air carrier had to pay compensation to a passenger in case that the
outward flight departed from a Member State and the cancellation happened on
the return flight from a third country. The CJEU answered in the negative. A
journey has to be divided into the parts ‘outward flight’ and ‘return flight’. The
application of the Regulation has to be ascertained for both parts separately. The
CJEU distinguished the terms referred to in the Regulation from the ones in the
Montreal Convention, which under Article 1(3) considers a carriage performed by
several successive carriers to be ‘one undivided carriage’ if it has been booked as
a ‘single operation’. In the literature, it is claimed that the result reached by the
CJEU would not respect the primacy of the Montreal Convention and additionally,
would lead to a deterioration of the legal position of passengers who booked a
journey with a non-European air carrier and who on their return flight to the EU
are affected by denied boarding, cancellation or delay. Questions regarding the
applicability of the Regulation arise, if the concerned ‘outward flight’ or ‘return
flight’ consists of different segments.96
The substantive application of the Regulation is divided into ‘denied board-
ing’ (Article 4), ‘cancellation’ (Article 5) and ‘delay’ (Article 6), each giving rise to
different rights for air passengers. According to Article 4(3), if boarding is denied
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to passengers against their will, the operating air carrier has to immediately
compensate them in accordance with Article 7 and assist them in accordance with
Articles 8 and 9. Article 2(j) defines ‘denied boarding’ as a refusal to carry passen-
gers on a flight, although they have presented themselves for boarding, except
where there are reasonable grounds to deny them boarding, such as reasons of
health, safety or security, or inadequate travel documentation. The previous
Regulation 295/9197 limited the application of its provisions to cases where pas-
sengers are denied access to an overbooked flight. The cases Finnair98 and Rodrí-
guez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor99 raised the question of
whether the scope of a ‘denied boarding’ under Regulation 261/04 is limited to
cases of overbooking. The CJEU clarified with an identical reasoning that Regula-
tion 261/04 covers also denied boarding for other reasons, such as operational
reasons, in favour of a high level of protection of passengers. The CJEU disregards
the different motivations of the air carriers in both cases. While in Rodríguez
Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor the air carrier tried to reduce
its own damage by re-booking the places of the connecting flight since it mis-
takenly assumed that the passengers would not be on time, in Finnair the air
carrier re-scheduled the flights in order to reduce the damage to its passengers
caused by a strike of the airport stuff. It is doubted whether the undifferentiated
treatment of both situations gives the right incentives to air carriers.100
The practical problems in distinguishing between a ‘cancellation’ and a
‘delay’ have been addressed by the CJEU in Sturgeon.101 While a delay gives
passengers the right to assistance by the operating air carrier in accordance with
Articles 8 and 9, in case of a cancellation, under certain conditions, the air
passenger is entitled to compensation in accordance with Article 7. The CJEU
ruled firstly that a flight which is delayed, even if it is a long delay, cannot be
regarded as cancelled, if the flight is operated in accordance with the original
flight planning. If, however, the air carrier arranges for the passengers to be
carried on another flight whose original planning is different from that of the
flight for which the booking was made, this has to be regarded as a cancella-
tion.102 The distinction between ‘cancellation’ and ‘delay’, however, has lost its
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explosiveness with the further explanations of the CJEU, that also passengers of
delayed flights have a right to compensation when they reach their final destina-
tion three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled. The judge-
ment of the CJEU met with criticism not only from air carriers, but also from the
national courts, the Member States and the literature.103 As foreseen by Advocate-
General Sharpston ‘in seeking to avoid Scylla (obvious discrimination against
passengers whose flights are inordinately delayed when compared to passengers
who obtain automatic compensation for their cancelled flight), one is imme-
diately swept into Charybdis (legal uncertainty).’104 The uncertainty caused by the
judgment is reflected in the two preliminary references in Nelson,105 where the
CJEU confirmed despite all critics the compatibility of the right to compensation
in the event of a delayed flight with the right to compensation provided for by the
Montreal Convention.106 The loss of time inherent in a flight delay constitutes an
inconvenience within the meaning of Regulation No 261/2004 and cannot be
categorized as ‘damage occasioned by delay’ under Article 19 of the Montreal
Convention. The CJEU therefore held that the obligation under Regulation No 261/
2004 intended to compensate passengers whose flights are subject to a long delay
Overview of cases before the CJEU 213
103 For an overview of the literature, see: S. Garben, ‘Sky-high controversy and high-flying
claims? The Sturgeon case law in light of judicial activism, euroscepticism and eurolegalism’
(2013) 1 Common Market Law Review 15; Criticism regarding the ruling of the CJEU: K. Riesenhu-
ber, ‘Interpretation and Judicial Development of EU Private Law. The Example of the Sturgeon-
Case’ (2010) 4 European Review of Contract Law 384; J. Balfour, ‘Airline Liability for Delays: The
Court of Justice of the EU Rewrites EC Regulation 261/2004’ (2010) 1 Air and Space Law 71;
K. Arnold and P.M. de Leon, ‘Regulation (EC) 261/2004 in the Light of the Recent Decisions of the
European Court of Justice: Time for a Change?!’ (2010) 2 Air and Space Law 91; P.S. Dempsey and
S.O. Johansson, ‘Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws on the Issue of Delay in International
Air Carriage’ (2010) 3 Air and Space Law 207; L. Giesberts and G. Kleve, ‘Compensation for
Passengers in the Event of Flight Delays’ (2010) 4/5 Air and Space Law 293; R. Lawson and
T. Marland, ‘The Montreal Convention 1999 and the Decisions of the ECJ in the Cases of IATA and
Sturgeon – in Harmony or Discord?’ (2011) 2Air and Space Law 99.
104 AG Sharpston, opinion of 2 July 2009 – joined cases 402/07 and 432/07, n 26 above,
paragraph 96; See in this regard also: K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional
allocation of powers and general principles of EU law’ (2010) 6 Common Market Law Review 1629,
1637; The reference for a preliminary ruling of the Landgericht Köln submitted on 5 August 2011
explicitly asked if the case-law of the CJEU was consistent with the principle of the separation of
powers. The CJEU decided by order of 18 April 2013 in 413/11Germanwings GmbH v Thomas Amend
(CJEU) that there is no breach.
105 Joined cases 581/10 and 629/10, n 64 above. For a background on the reference for a
preliminary ruling by the High Court of Justice: C. van Dam, ‘Air Passenger Rights after Sturgeon’
(2011) 4/5Air and Space Law 259.
106 Very critical on this: S. Radoševic, ‘CJEU’s Decision in Nelson and Others in Light of the
Exclusivity of theMontreal Convention’ (2013) 2Air and Space Law 95.
is compatible with Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. If the passengers
concerned suffer also individual damage, they are not precluded from bringing in
addition actions to obtain, by way of redress on an individual basis, damages
under the conditions laid down by the Montreal Convention. As ascertained in
Sousa Rodríguez,107 Article 12 of the Regulation is intended to supplement the
application of measures provided for by that Regulation, so that passengers are
compensated for the entirety of the damage that they have suffered due to the
failure of the air carrier to fulfil its contractual obligations. That provision allows
the national court to order the air carrier to compensate damage arising from the
breach of the contract of carriage by air on a legal basis other than Regulation No
261/2004, being in particular the Montreal Convention and national law. In the
literature it was wrongly assumed that in Sturgeon the CJEU made the right to
compensation not only dependent on a delay in the time of arrival, but also on a
delay of the departure time.108 In Folkerts109 the CJEU had the occasion to clarify
that only the delay in relation to the scheduled time of arrival at the final
destination, this means the destination of the last flight of the concerned passen-
ger, was relevant. In Cuadrench Moré110 the CJEU ruled further that the time-limits
for bringing actions to claim compensation under Articles 5 and 7 of the Regula-
tion are determined by the national law of each Member State and not by the
Montreal Convention.
In accordance with Article 5(3) of Regulation 261/04 air carriers are relieved
of their obligation to pay compensation in the event of ‘extraordinary circum-
stances’ which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had
been taken. In Wallentin-Hermann111 the CJEU clarified that the fact that an air
carrier has complied with the minimum rules on maintenance of an aircraft
cannot in itself suffice to establish that that carrier has taken ‘all reasonable
measures’. The CJEU favoured a strict interpretation. Only problems that stem
from events which, by their nature or origin, are not inherent in the normal
exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are beyond its actual
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control, are covered.112 In Eglītis and Ratnieks113 the CJEU clarified further that in
order to show that all reasonable measures have been taken, an air carrier has to
provide for some reserve time in order to be able to operate the flight once the
extraordinary circumstances have come to an end. However, extraordinary cir-
cumstances do not release the air carrier from its obligation to provide care. In
accordance withMcDonagh114 air carriers have even in the event of a closure of the
European air space lasting several days an unlimited duty to provide care in
accordance with Article 5(1)(b) and Article 9. The high level of consumer protec-
tion could have extensive financial consequences for air carriers and is criticized
as being disproportionate.115 As already signalled in Sousa Rodríguez and con-
firmed by McDonagh, the Regulation seems to provide for a right to financial
compensation in the event of a wrongful omission of care.116
3 Travel marketing and travel insurance (case 134/11
Blödel-Pawlik; case 112/11 ebookers.com Deutschland)
a) Refund in the event of insolvency of the package organiser on account of
its fraudulent use of the funds transferred by consumers (case 134/11
Blödel-Pawlik)
aa) Facts
The German Landgericht Hamburg asked the CJEU whether Article 7 of Directive
90/314/EEC117 covers the situation in which the insolvency of the travel organiser
is attributable to its own fraudulent conduct.
The consumer booked package travel with Rhein Reisen GmbH. Rhein Reisen
GmbH informed the consumer before the start of the trip that it was obliged to
declare itself insolvent. In accordance with the indications given by the Land-
gericht Hamburg, Rhein Reisen GmbH never really intended to organise the
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booked trip and became insolvent because of its own fraudulent conduct. Hanse-
Merkur, the insurer of the travel organiser, argues that it is not required to arrange
a refund, since Article 7 of Directive 90/314 does not cover a situation where the
travel has been cancelled solely because of fraudulent conduct on the part of the
travel organiser.
bb) Main reasoning
With reference to its judgments in Dillenkofer118 and Rechberger119 the CJEU ruled
that the consumer protection guaranteed by the Directive in the event of insol-
vency of the organiser of package travel is also applicable if the insolvency is
attributable to the travel organiser’s own conduct. Article 7 of the Directive
specifically aims at the protection of consumers against the consequences of
insolvency, whatever the causes of it may be.120 In line with the objective of
Directive 90/314 to ensure a high level of protection for consumers, the fact that
the insolvency of the travel organiser is attributable to its own fraudulent conduct
cannot constitute an obstacle to the refund of money paid for the travel under
Article 7.121
cc) Integration in the case-law
The obligation of the travel organiser to provide sufficient evidence of security
implies that a refund of the money paid for the travel must be actually available
to the consumer in case of insolvency. The CJEU ruled that not even fraudulent
conduct on part of the travel organiser could constitute a bar for securing
repatriation and the refund of money to the consumers. It is questioned whether
the CJEU has found a right balance between the aim of ensuring a high level of
protection for consumers and the practical implications of such endeavor for
travel organisers and their insurers.122
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b) Acceptance of travel cancellation insurance during the selling of flight tickets
on ‘opt-in’ basis (case 112/11 ebookers.com Deutschland)
aa) Facts
The German Oberlandesgericht Köln referred to the CJEU the question whether
costs for services provided by third parties (in this case, an insurer offering travel
cancellation insurance) which are charged to the air traveller by the company
organising the air travel together with the air fare as part of a total price constitute
‘optional price supplements’ within the meaning of Article 23(1) of Regulation
1008/08.123 In the affirmative case, the acceptance by the customer has to be on
an opt-in basis.
In this case, the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV (Federal Union of
Consumer Organisations and Associations) brought an action against ebookers.
com Deutschland to refrain from presetting the taking out of travel cancellation
insurance in the procedure for booking flights set up on its internet portal. When
a customer has selected a specific flight during the booking process, the costs
relating to the reservation are listed in the top right-hand corner of the internet
page under the heading ‘your current travel costs’. This list includes the actual
price of the flight, the amounts in respect of ‘taxes and fees’ and the costs for
‘travel cancellation insurance’. There is a notice at the bottom of the website
indicating how the customer should proceed – by means of an opt-out – should
he not wish to take out travel cancellation insurance. The Oberlandesgericht Köln
doubted whether the Regulation was applicable because the offer at issue did not
originate from an air carrier, but from an economically and legally distinct
insurance company.
bb) Main reasoning
First of all, the CJEU pointed out that Article 23(1) of Regulation 1008/08 seeks
to ensure that there is information and transparency with regard to the prices
for air services.124 ‘Optional price supplements’ relate to services which, supple-
menting the air service itself, are neither compulsory nor necessary for the
carriage of passengers or cargo. It is required that such price supplements are
communicated in a clear, transparent and unambiguous way at the start of any
booking process, and that their acceptance by the customer must be on an opt-in
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basis.125 Thereby it shall be prevented that a customer is induced to purchase
additional services which are not unavoidable and necessary for the purposes of
the flight itself, unless he chooses them expressly.126 That requirement corre-
sponds to Article 22 of Directive 2011/83/EU127 on consumer rights, which provides
that the trader must seek the express consent of the consumer to any extra
payment in addition to the remuneration for the main contractual obligation and
that that consent cannot be inferred by using default options.128 Referring to the
opinion of Advocate-General Mazák, the CJEU clarified that it would be at odds
with the purpose of Article 23(1) if the consumer protection were to depend on
whether the optional additional service originates from an air carrier or from a
company which is legally and economically separate from it.129 Contrary to what
ebookers.com claimed, what matters is only that the service and the correspond-
ing price are offered in relation to the flight itself during the flight booking
process, independent of the status of the provider of the optional additional
service connected with the flight.130 Consequently, the concept of ‘optional price
supplements’ covers costs, connected with the air travel, arising from services
supplied by a party other than the air carrier and charged to the customer by the
person selling that travel, together with the air fare, as part of a total price.131
cc) Integration in the case-law
Article 23 of Regulation 1008/08 provides compulsory measures to increase price
transparency and forbids price discrimination. It thereby addresses the abusive
practice by air carriers of charging automatically optional services, which the
consumer only realises when the booking is completed. In order to meet the
objective of the Regulation it has to be ensured that all elements of the costs are
clear to the customer so that he can make an informed decision about the service.
The CJEU clarified that optional price supplements provided by parties other than
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the carrier fall within the scope of the Regulation.132 In the literature it is cautioned
that service unbundling could lead to opacity resulting in little benefit for the
consumer. The effective comparability of price for air services would need to be
ensured.133
III Financial services
1 Consumer credit (case 509/07 Scarpelli; case 602/10
SC Volksbank România)
a) Consumer’s right to terminate the credit agreement in case of breach of the
contract of sale by the supplier and in the absence of an exclusive relationship
between the supplier and the grantor of credit (case 509/07 Scarpelli)
aa) Facts
The Italian Tribunale di Bergamo asked the CJEU whether under Article 11(2) of
Directive 87/102/EEC134 an agreement between a grantor of credit and a supplier
according to which credit is made available exclusively by that grantor of credit
to customers of that supplier is a necessary condition for the right of the customer
to terminate the credit agreement and claim reimbursement of the sums already
paid to the grantor of credit where the supplier is in breach of contract.
The consumer signed a purchase contract for a motor vehicle and at the same
time a form – provided by the supplier – applying for a loan from Finemiro SpA
(the grantor of credit), whose rights were acquired by NEOS Banca. After the
consumer had made 24 monthly repayments and the vehicle had still not been
delivered to him, he ceased making the repayments and claimed the reimburse-
ment of the sums already paid. NEOS Banca contested the consumer’s claims on
the ground that Article 11 of Directive 87/102 exempts the grantor of credit from
liability in all cases where there is no exclusive relationship between the grantor
of credit and the supplier.
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bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU held that where the national legislation applicable to contractual
relations provides that the consumer is entitled to pursue remedies against the
grantor of credit in order to obtain the termination of the credit agreement and the
reimbursement of the sums already paid, Directive 87/102 does not make the
exercise of such remedies subject to the requirement of exclusivity in Article 11(2).
With reference to its decisions in Berliner Kindl Brauerei135 and Cofinoga,136 the
CJEU emphasized the objectives of the Directive to create a common consumer
credit market and to ensure the protection of consumers who avail themselves of
such a credit.137 Article 11 of Directive 87/102/EEC provides that a consumer is
entitled to pursue remedies against the grantor of credit in the event that the
supplier fails to perform its obligations under the condition, inter alia, of the
existence of an exclusive relationship between the supplier and the grantor of
credit.138 The CJEU interpreted Article 11(2) in the light of the 21st recital of the
preamble to the Directive. Accordingly this provision provides further protection
for the consumer vis-à-vis the grantor of credit, in addition to the remedies that
the consumer is already entitled to pursue on the basis of the national provisions
applicable to all contractual relationships. Consequently, the various conditions
under Article 11(2) have to be satisfied only with regard to those additional
rights.139 With reference to the 25th recital of the preamble to the Directive and its
decision in Rampion and Godard140 the CJEU ruled that such a reading is consis-
tent with the intended minimal harmonisation in matters of consumer credit.141
The consumer is neither able to exert any influence on the relationship between
the supplier and the grantor of credit nor has the consumer the possibility to
amend the conditions of the credit agreement. Making the consumer’s pursuit of
remedies against the grantor of credit subject to the condition that there is a pre-
existing exclusivity clause between him and the supplier would be at variance
with the consumer protection aims of the Directive.142 However, ‘such a condition
may need to be satisfied in order to assert other rights, not covered by national
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measures on contractual relations, such as the right to damages for loss caused
by a breach of obligations by the supplier of goods or services in question.’143
cc) Integration in the case-law
Even thought the CJEU does not refer explicitly to Article 15 of Directive 87/102/
EEC, the decision is seen to be consistent with the minimal harmonisation nature
of the Directive. The Italian case-law, according to which the rights pursued by
the consumer are not subject to the condition that there is a pre-existing exclusiv-
ity clause between the grantor of credit and the supplier, is consistent with the
Directive.144 The new Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit145 which constitu-
tes a full harmonisation instrument defines in Article 3(n) a linked credit agree-
ment as an agreement where the credit serves exclusively to finance the purchase
contract and the two agreements form an ‘objective unit’. In accordance with the
10th recital of the preamble to the Directive, the Member States may expand the
provisions of the Directive 2008/48/EC to further linked credit agreements which
do not fall within the definition contained in the Directive.146
b) Scope of the harmonisation by Directive 2008/48/EC
(case 602/10 Volksbank România)
aa) Facts
The questions submitted for a preliminary ruling by the Romanian Judecătoria
Călăraşi concerned various aspects of Directive 2008/48/EC, in particular the
material and temporal scope of the Directive, the obligations of credit institutes
regarding the levying of bank charges and the role of out-of-court resolution
procedures under the Directive.
The proceedings concerned the credit agreements between Volksbank Româ-
nia and its customers secured by rights in immovable property. The general
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conditions provide that the customer is required to pay the bank a risk charge
equal to 0.2% of the balance of the loan and that it must be paid monthly
throughout the entire term of the agreement. The contracts had been concluded
before the date when the Romanian measures implementing Directive 2008/48/
EC entered into force. After the date of entry into force, the national consumer
protection authority imposed a fine and ancillary penalties on the Volksbank
România as it took the view that the levying of the risk charges was unlawful.
Volksbank România challenged the measures before court.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU confirmed that Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC does not preclude
including in the material scope credit agreements which are secured by immova-
ble property, even though Article 2(2)(a) excludes them from the scope of the
Directive. It follows from Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48 that, so far as it
concerns credit agreements which fall within the Directive’s scope, the Directive
provides for full harmonisation and that, as regards the covered matters, the
Member States are not authorised to maintain or introduce different national
provisions.147 However, as it follows from recital 10 of the preamble, the Member
States may, in accordance with European Union law, apply provisions of that
Directive to areas not covered by its scope.148 Therefore, it is also in principle for
the Member States to determine the conditions for the extension of their imple-
menting provision to credit agreements which do not fall within the harmonisa-
tion. Consequently, Article 30(1) does not preclude defining the temporal scope
so that the national implementing measure also applies to credit agreements
secured by immovable property which were existing on the date when that
national implementing measure entered into force.149 The Romanian implement-
ing provision that contains an exhaustive list of admissible bank charges is
compatible with Article 22(1) of the Directive. The Directive provides only for
obligations relating to the information about bank charges, but does not contain
substantive rules relating to the types of charges that the creditor may levy.150
Moreover, recital 44 of the preamble requires that, in order to ensure market
transparency and stability, Member States should ensure that appropriate mea-
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sures for the regulation or supervision of the activity of creditors are in place.151
The prohibition of certain bank charges is compatible with the freedom to
provide services.152 Referring to Alassini153 the CJEU states that it is for the Member
States to lay down the details of out-of-court resolution procedures, including the
question whether they are mandatory or not.154 Out-of-court dispute resolution
procedures have to be, however, adequate and effective. It is not possible to derive
from Article 24(1) an obligation to require that those procedures are used before
any recourse to the consumer protection authority is possible.155 Consequently, the
Directive does not preclude the Romanian rule that allows consumers to have
direct recourse to the consumer protection authority, which may subsequently
impose penalties on credit institutions, without having to use beforehand the out-
of-court resolution procedures.156
cc) Integration in the case-law
The case Volksbank România concerns the division of legislative competences
between the EU and the Member States when it comes to full harmonisation
instruments. Full harmonisation is considered to be the new standard in the area
of European consumer law. It was questionable whether a Member State may
extend the rules of Directive 2008/48/EC to ancillary areas and whether the
extended national legislation may diverge from the Directive. The CJEU clarified
that under a full harmonisation instrument the Member States are allowed to
extend its application to areas that do not fall within its scope, provided that
compliance with the general framework of EU law as required by the TFEU and
relevant secondary law is ensured.157
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2 Insurance law and consumer protection (case 577/11 DKV
Belgium; case 442/12 Sneller)
a) Consumer protection against unexpected increases in insurance premium
rates (case 577/11 DKV Belgium SA)
aa) Facts
The Belgian Cour d’appel de Bruxelles asked the CJEU whether the national
system for premium rate increases is in compliance with Articles 29 and 39(2) and
(3) of Directive 92/49/EEC,158 Article 8(3) of Directive 73/239/EEC159 and Articles 49
TFEU and 56 TFEU. The Belgian provision provides with regard to health insur-
ance contracts not linked to professional activity that the premium, the excess
payable and the benefit can be adapted annually only on the basis of the
consumer price index or on the basis of the ‘medical index’ if it exceeds the
consumer price index. Moreover, the administrative authority responsible for the
supervision of insurance undertakings may, at the request of an insurance under-
taking, authorise that undertaking to take measures in order to balance its
premium rates where they give or risk giving rise to losses notwithstanding the
adaptations calculated on the basis of those two types of indices.
The Belgian insurance undertaking DKV informed all its insured parties
holding supplementary hospitalisation insurance for ‘individual room’ coverage
that it would increase the premiums in 2010 by 7.84%. The administrative author-
ity responsible for the supervision of insurance undertakings rejected DKV’s
request for an increase before. The Belgian consumer organisation Test-Achats
brought an action for an injunction seeking to have DKV ordered to reverse its
decision to increase premiums.
bb) Main reasoning
Contrary to the position of the European Commission and DKV, the CJEU ruled
that the Belgian system of premium rate increases is not contrary to the principle
of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector provided for in Articles 29
and 39(2) and (3) of Directive 92/49 and 8(3) of Directive 73/239. Full harmonisa-
224 Hans-W. Micklitz and Betül Kas
158 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, Regulations and
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Third Non-life Insurance Directive),OJEC 1992 L228/1.
159 First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, Regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct
insurance other than life assurance,OJEC 1973 L228/3.
tion in the field of non-life insurance rates cannot be presumed.160 A technical
framework for the calculation of the premiums is not contrary to the principle of
freedom to set rates on the sole ground that that it affects premium rate
changes.161 The Belgian system that allows premium rate increases only on the
basis of two types of indices functions as such a technical framework, which
provides a structure for rate changes according to which insurance undertakings
can freely set their premiums.162 This conclusion cannot be questioned by the
mere fact that the administrative authority may authorise an insurance under-
taking to take measures in order to balance its premium rates where they give or
risk giving rise to losses.163
Nevertheless, the Belgian system of premium rate increases constitutes a
restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services
since insurance undertakings, which are established in another Member State
and want to enter the Belgian market, have to re-think their business policy and
strategy when setting the rates for their premiums.164 The restriction on the free-
dom of establishment and the freedom to provide services is, however, justified.
The Belgian system of premium rate increases which prevents insurance under-
takings from implementing sharp and unexpected increases in insurance pre-
mium rates is suitable and proportional for securing the attainment of the objec-
tive of consumer protection, which is an overriding requirement relating to the
public interest.165 In the case of hospitalisation insurance, the probability of
involvement by insurers increases with the age of the insured parties. Conse-
quently, supplementary hospitalisation insurance for ‘individual room’ coverage
may be offered at low rates to young people, while with the increased age of the
insured party, the costs tend to increase.166 The Belgian system of premium rate
increases provides for a guarantee ‘that the insured party, precisely at an age
when he needs that insurance, will not be faced by a sharp, unexpected increase
in his insurance premium rates which will deprive him of the benefit of that
insurance if he is unable to meet the costs thereof.’167 The insurance undertaking
is not prevented, at the time of setting the basic premium, from taking into
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account the higher costs when the insured party becomes older or to make a
request for an increase before the administrative authority.168
b) Insured persons’ freedom to choose a lawyer under Directive 87/344/EEC
169
(case 442/12 Sneller)
aa) Facts
The Dutch Hoge Raad asked the CJEU whether a legal expenses insurer may
stipulate in its insurance contracts that legal assistance will in principle be
provided by its employees and that the costs of legal assistance provided by a
lawyer or legal representative chosen freely by the insured person will be covered
only if the insurer takes the view that the handling of the case must be subcon-
tracted to an external lawyer.
Mr Sneller, who took out legal expenses insurance, wished to bring legal
proceedings against his former employer in order to claim damages on the ground
of unfair dismissal. In this regard, he intended to be assisted by a lawyer of his
choosing and to have the costs of legal assistance covered by his legal expenses
insurer. The insurer has indicated its agreement to such legal proceedings being
brought, but considers that the insurance contract does not provide, in such a
case, cover for the costs of legal assistance provided by a lawyer chosen by the
insured person, but only through one of its own employees.
bb) Main reasoning
By relying on its case-law in Eschig170 and Stark,171 the CJEU held that Article 4(1)
(a) of Directive 87/344/EEC precludes a legal expenses insurer to stipulate in its
insurance contracts that legal assistance will in principle be provided by its
employees and that the costs of a freely chosen lawyer or legal representative will
be covered only if the insurer takes the view that the handling of the case must be
subcontracted to an external lawyer.172 However, the Member States are not
obliged to require insurers, in all circumstances, to cover in full the costs incurred
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in connection with the defence of an insured person, on condition that that
freedom is not rendered meaningless. The insured personmust be given a de facto
reasonable choice of representative.173 The ruling of the CJEU is not dependent on
whether legal assistance is compulsory under national law in the inquiry or
proceedings concerned.174
cc) Integration in the case-law
The CJEU confirmed its previous case-law that the insured persons’ freedom to
choose a lawyer under Directive 87/344/EEC is unconditional and only subject to
the exceptions in Article 5 of the Directive. The financial interests of the insurer can
be only protected through a limitation of the costs covered by the insurance.175
IV Anti-discrimination law and consumer
protection (case 236/09 Test-Achats;
case 394/11 Belov)
 
a) Sex as a factor in the assessment of insurance risks (case 236/09
Test-Achats)
aa) Facts
The Belgian Cour constitutionnelle asked the CJEU whether Article 5(2) of Direc-
tive 2004/113176 which derogates from the general rule requiring unisex insurance
premiums is compatible with the principle of equal treatment for men and
women.
The Belgian consumer organisation Test-Achats and two private individuals
brought an action before the Belgian Cour constitutionnelle for annulment of the
Belgian Law transposing the Equal Treatment Directive 2004/113/EC. The appli-
cants claimed that the Belgian Law is contrary to the principle of equality between
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men and women because it implements the derogation provided for in Article 5(2)
of Directive 2004/113/EC.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU ruled that the exemption without temporal limitation from the rule of
unisex premiums and benefits laid down in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113 is
invalid with effect from 21 December 2012 because it is incompatible with Article
21 and Article 23 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.177 The EU
legislature must contribute, in a coherent manner, to the achievement of the
intended objective of equal treatment for men and woman.178 Since at the time
when the Directive was adopted the use of actuarial factors related to sex was
widespread in the provision of insurance services, it was permissible for the EU
legislature to implement the application of the rule of unisex premiums and
benefits gradually with appropriate transitional periods.179 Article 5(1) provides
that the differences in premiums and benefits based on sex must be abolished by
21 December 2007 at the latest.180 Article 5(2) provides for the option for Member
States to permit without temporal limitation proportionate differences in indivi-
duals’ premiums and benefits where sex is, based on relevant and accurate
actuarial and statistical data, a determining risk factor.181 Contrary to the Council,
which argued that Article 5(2) was intended to make it possible not to treat
different situations in the same way, the CJEU ruled that the Directive is based on
the premise that the respective situations of men and women with regard to
insurance premiums and benefits are comparable.182 Article 5(2) must therefore be
considered to be invalid upon the expiry of an appropriate transitional period.183
cc) Integration in the case-law
Under reference to the higher-ranking rights in Article 21 and 23 of the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the CJEU declared Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/
113/EC invalid and introduced a European-wide prohibition to offer insurance
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products which differentiate premiums and benefits according to sex.184 The terse
reasoning of the CJEU caused criticism. The CJEU refrains from dealing with the
scope of the principle of equal treatment in relation to insurance contracts more
deeply.185 The CJEU based its decision merely on the recitals 18 and 19 in the
preamble of the Directive according to which Article 5(2) is a ‘derogation’ from the
rule of unisex premiums and benefits. Contrary to this, Advocate-General Kokott
tries to explain in her opinion why uniform premiums should be required based
on the principle of equal treatment. While the Advocate-General recognises that
recourse to prognoses via group examination is indispensable in actuarial calcu-
lations of premiums and benefits in order to make the risk calculable, the use of a
person’s sex as a substitute criterion for other distinguishing features is incompa-
tible with the principle of equal treatment.186 Nevertheless, her argument that
social and economic criterions would be more significant is said not to be convin-
cing.187 The consideration of the freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of possible justifications for differentia-
tion is missing.188
b) Application of the principle of equal treatment to the right of the consumer to
read his individual electricity consumption (case 394/11 Belov)
aa) Facts
The Bulgarian Commission for Protection against Discrimination (KZD) referred to
the CJEU a number of questions on the interpretation of Directive 2000/43/EC.189
Essentially, the main issue was whether it constitutes indirect discrimination if in
districts which are inhabited predominantly by a certain ethnic group, access to
electricity meters is more difficult than in other districts where this is not the case.
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In the Bulgarian city of Montana, in two areas mainly inhabited by members
of the Roma community, electricity meters had been attached to electricity poles
at a height of 7 m. Outside of these districts the electricity meters are placed at a
height of up to 1.70 m, usually in the consumer’s home or on the outside walls of
the building. For the concerned inhabitants it is only possible to make a direct
visual check if they have an inspection meter installed in their home, for which a
fee has to be paid. An indirect visual check free of charge, which is not used in
practice, is possible by an employee of the ChEZ Raspredelenie Balgaria, the
owner of the electricity distribution network, which on written request by the
consumer by means of a lifting platform reads the electricity meter. A concerned
inhabitant made a complaint against the energy supplier ChEZ Elektro Balgaria
AD (CEB) claiming that the placing of electricity meters at a height of 7 m
discriminates against him on the basis of his ethnic origin.
bb) Main reasoning
Contrary to the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, the views of the European
Commission and the Bulgarian Government, the CJEU ruled that the KZD could
not be regarded as a ‘court’ or ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU
and that the CJEU does not have jurisdiction to rule on the questions referred by
this institution. The decisions of the KZD do not have a judicial nature, but have
to be qualified as administrative decisions.190 A reference for a preliminary ruling
is not excluded since the decision of the KZD is subject to appeal before an
administrative court and the person concerned has the possibility to initiate civil
proceedings instead of administrative proceedings before the KZD.191
Advocate-General Kokott confirmed the applicability of Directive 2000/43/
EC. It was in question whether Article (3)(1)(h) concerning the access to and
supply of goods and services which are available to the public includes, in
addition to electricity supply, the provision of electricity meters. The Advocate-
General explained that not only the electricity supply per se is covered by the
scope of Directive 2000/43, but also the conditions under which that electricity
supply is provided, including the provision of electricity meters.192 Contrary to the
submissions of CEB that consumers have no entitlement to the installation of a
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free electricity meter, Advocate-General Kokott explained that national rules
which make the existence of discrimination dependent on the infringement of
rights or interests defined in law are incompatible with Directive 2000/43.193
Considering the circumstances of the main proceedings, the Advocate-General
assumed that there is a ‘prima facie case’ of indirect discrimination based on
ethnic origin within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 and
consequently, the burden of proof is reversed in accordance with Article 8(1) of
Directive 2000/43.194 The measure at issue may be justified if it prevents fraud and
abuse and contributes to ensuring the quality of the electricity supply in the
interest of all consumers, provided that the measure taken is proportionate.195
cc) Integration in the case-law
As pointed out by Advocate-General Kokott, the case was ‘particularly sensitive’.
The Roma community, which is concerned by the alleged discrimination in the
main proceedings, is Europe’s largest minority group.196 The CJEU escaped the
assessment of the merits of the referred questions by a strict interpretation of the
conditions for the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling under
Article 267 TFEU. The differences in the interpretation of the CJEU and the opinion
of Advocate-General Kokott relating the question whether the Commission for
Protection against Discrimination can be regarded as ‘court’ or ‘tribunal’ are
considerable.197 It remains to be seen whether the problem will be referred
another time to the CJEU by the Bulgarian courts. The opinion of the Advocate-
General brings up difficult questions. The risk of an ethnic group being stigma-
tised and the interests of the electricity consumers affected in monitoring regu-
larly their individual electricity consumption have to be assessed with regard to
ensuring the security and quality of the energy supply in the general interest.198
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V Legal protection
1 Jurisdiction over consumer contracts (case 180/06 Ilsinger;
case 204/08 Rehder; joined cases 585/08 Pammer and
144/09 Hotel Alpenhof; case 327/10 Hypoteční banka;
case 190/11Mühlleitner; case 419/11 Česká spořitelna;
case 218/12 Emrek; case 478/12Maletic)
a) Jurisdiction in the case of an action seeking payment of the prize which the
consumer appears to have won on the basis of a misleading advertisement
(case 180/06 Ilsinger)
aa) Facts
The Austrian Oberlandesgericht Wien asked whether the legal proceedings by
which a consumer seeks an order requiring a mail-order company to award a
prize apparently won by him are contractual in nature within the meaning of
Article 15(1)(c) of the Regulation 44/2001,199 if necessary, on condition that the
consumer has placed an order, even though the award of that prize was not
dependent on an order of goods.
The applicant, an Austrian national domiciled in Austria, received a notifica-
tion which was addressed personally to her, stating that she had won a prize of
EUR 20,000 from Schlank & Schick GmbH, established in Aachen (Germany). The
payment was not made conditional upon ordering goods or placing a trial order.
The parties disagree as to whether the applicant ordered goods. Since her request
for payment by returning the ‘prize claim certificate’ attached to the letter failed,
the applicant brought an action for the payment of the prize ostensibly promised.
bb) Main reasoning
Although the CJEU ruled in its previous case-law that the application of Article 13
of the Brussels Convention is limited to contracts which give rise to reciprocal and
interdependent obligations between the parties, the scope of Article 15(1)(c) of
Regulation No 44/2001 appears, by contrast, to be no longer being limited to
those situations in which the parties have assumed reciprocal obligations.200
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However, in order to ensure, in accordance with recital 19 of the preamble to the
Regulation, continuity in the interpretation of the two instruments, the case-law
in Gabriel201 and Engler202 relating to Article 13 of the Brussels Convention must be
transposed to Article 15 of Regulation 44/2001.203 Consequently, the application
of Article 15(1)(c) depends on whether the professional has assumed a legal
obligation to pay the prize to the consumer. If this is not the case, such a situation
would at most be liable to be classified as pre-contractual or quasi contractual
and, where appropriate, be covered by Article 5(1) of the Regulation, if the
consumer has not in fact placed an order with that professional vendor.204
cc) Integration in the case-law
Ilsinger gave the CJEU the opportunity to further develop its case-law relating to
the question whether the claim for the fulfilment of a prize notification is covered
by the jurisdiction over consumer contracts. In Gabriel the CJEU made clear that
the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts under the Brussels Convention
are applicable if the prize notification was intimately linked to an order for goods
and such an order had in fact been placed.205 In Engler the jurisdiction over
consumer contracts under the Brussels Convention was not given because the
prize notification was not made conditional upon ordering goods and, in fact, no
order had been placed by that consumer.206 Since Regulation 44/2001 intends to
enhance the protection of the consumer interests compared to the Brussels Con-
vention, the CJEU ruled in Ilsinger, contrary to its previous case-law, that Article 15
is not limited to cases in which the parties have assumed reciprocal obligations.207
In this way, it is possible to ensure better protection for consumers with regard to
new means of communication and the development of electronic commerce.208
Unilateral consumer contracts are covered by Article 15 of the Regulation.209
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Advocate-General Trstenjak proposed to assess the question whether an offer has
been made from the standpoint of the offeree.210
b) Jurisdiction over claims for compensation of air passengers (case 204/08
Rehder)
aa) Facts
The German Bundesgerichtshof referred to the CJEU the question whether under
the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 44/2001, in the case of intra-
Community flights, the single place of performance for all contractual obligations
must be the place of the main provision of services, determined according to
economic criteria. If the answer is affirmative, it was questioned whether the
single place of performance is determined by the place of departure or the place
of arrival.
The applicant, who resides in Munich, booked a flight from Munich (Ger-
many) to Vilnius (Lithuania) with Air Baltic, the registered office of which is in
Riga. Following a flight cancellation, he arrived six hours after the scheduled time
of arrival of the flight which he had initially booked. The passenger claimed
compensation for the amount of EUR 250 in accordance with Articles 5(1)(c) and
7(1)(a) of Regulation 261/2004.
bb) Main reasoning
Firstly, the CJEU confirmed that transport contracts are to be regarded as service
contracts within the meaning of the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation
44/2001. Regarding the determination of the place of performance, the referring
court pointed to its uncertainty regarding the applicability of the decision of the
CJEU in Color Drack211 to the dispute at hand. The CJEU explains that in this case
the place of performance had to be determined for a purchase contract in which
several places of delivery had been foreseen.212 Following Color Drack,213 in order
to reinforce the objectives of unification of the rules of jurisdiction and predict-
ability, also in a case where there are several places of delivery within a single
234 Hans-W. Micklitz and Betül Kas
210 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 11 September 2008 – case 180/06, n 200 above, paragraph 51.
211 Case 386/05 Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECR I‑3699
(CJEU).
212 Case 204/08 Peter Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation [2009] ECR I-06073 (CJEU), paragraphs 29,
30.
213 Case 386/05, n 211 above, paragraphs 36, 38.
Member State, only one court must have jurisdiction to hear all the claims arising
out of the contract.214 The factors in Color Drack are transferable to contracts for
the provision of services, also if the provision of services is not effected in a single
Member State.215 In accordance with this, it is necessary to identify the place with
the closest linking factor between the contract and the court having jurisdiction,
in particular the place where the main provision of services is to be carried out.216
A direct link to the object of the contract is only given at the place of departure
and the place of arrival of the aircraft, which are determined in the air transport
contract.217 Since it is impossible to determine a place of the main provision of
services on the basis of economic criterions, the applicant may choose between
the place of departure and the place of arrival.218 Such a choice granted to the
applicant, apart from respecting the criterion of proximity, also satisfies the
requirement of predictability.219
cc) Integration in the case-law
In the case of contracts for services the CJEU granted the applicant the right to
choose between the possible courts having international and territorial jurisdic-
tion, if a number of services are provided and none of these service can be
qualified as the main provision of services on the basis of economic criterions.
The decision reinforces the rights of air passengers without burdening air carriers
in an unpredictable way. It is said that the risk of forum shopping can be regarded
as low in cases of requests for compensation under Regulation 261/04.220 More-
over, the decision of the CJEU is said to be in line with the aim to ensure a
jurisdiction with a close link to the matters and proofs.221 For cases, however, in
which the contract for services is not an air transport contract, it is considered
that the decision does not provide for a sufficient degree of legal certainty.222
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c) Directing of activities to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile
(joined cases 585/08 Pammer and 144/09 Hotel Alpenhof)
aa) Facts
The Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof referred to the CJEU in both cases the question
whether the fact that a website, which presents the activity of the trader, can be
consulted on the internet is sufficient for the finding that an activity is being
‘directed’ to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile within the meaning of
Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001. In case 585/08 it had to be firstly clarified
whether a ‘voyage by freighter’ constitutes package travel for the purposes of
Article 15(3) of Regulation 44/2001.
In the case 585/08 the applicant, who resides in Austria, booked a voyage
by freighter with Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG, a company which is
established in Germany. The voyage was booked through Internationale Fracht-
schiffreisen Pfeiffer GmbH, an intermediary company which is established in
Germany and offers its voyages on the Austrian market via a website. Since the
description on the website did not correspond to the conditions on the vessel, the
applicant refused to embark. The Reederei reimbursed only a part of that sum
paid for the voyage.
In the case 144/09 the defendant, who resides in Germany, found out about
the Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH, which is established in Austria, via the hotel’s
website. The enquiry about a room, the offer made by the hotel and the accep-
tance were effected by email. The email address of the hotel was given on the
website. The defendant received the hotel services but then departed without
paying the bill in full.
bb) Main reasoning
With regard to the first question in Pammer, the CJEU, referring to its ruling in
Club-Tour223 and Article(6)(4)(b) of Regulation 593/2008224 read in conjunction
with Article 2(1) of Directive 90/314,225 stated that a contract concerning a voyage
by freighter constitutes a contract of transport which provides for a combination
of travel and accommodation within the meaning of Article 15(3) of Regulation
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44/2001.226 With regard to the joint question of both cases, the CJEU first of all
clarified that the fact that the website of the trader or the website of an intermedi-
ary can be consulted on the internet abroad is not sufficient for the finding that an
activity is being ‘directed’ to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile within
the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001.227 In order for Article 15(1)(c)
of Regulation 44/2001 to be applicable, the trader must have manifested its
intention to establish commercial relations with consumers from one or more
other Member States.228 The following matters are, inter alia, capable of constitut-
ing evidence from which it may be concluded that the trader’s activity is directed
to the Member State of the consumer’s domicile:
‘[…] the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member States for
going to the place where the trader is established, use of a language or a currency other than
the language or currency generally used in the Member State in which the trader is established
with the possibility of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, mention
of telephone numbers with an international code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referen-
cing service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by
consumers domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that
of the Member State in which the trader is established, and mention of an international
clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member States.’229
The mere mentioning of an email address or of other contact details or the use of a
language or a currency which are the language and/or currency generally used in
the Member State in which the trader is established are insufficient.230
cc) Integration in the case-law
TheCJEUhad todecide for the first timewhenanundertakingdirects its activities to
the Member State of the consumer’s domicile by operating a website. The Grand
Chamber of the CJEU elaborated criterionswhich allow the conclusion that a trader
hasmanifested its intention to establish commercial relationswith consumers from
one or more other Member States, including that of the consumer’s domicile. The
criteria established by the CJEU, however, did meet in part fierce criticism.231
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d) Jurisdiction in the case of an unknown domicile of the defendant consumer
(case 327/10 Hypoteční banka)
aa) Facts
In the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Czech Okresní soud v Chebu the
CJEU determined whether the conditions for the applicability of Regulation 44/
2001 are met if one of the parties to the court proceedings is a national of a
Member State other than the one in which those proceedings are taking place.
Furthermore, the CJEU answered the question whether Regulation 44/2001 pre-
cludes the use of provisions of national law which enable proceedings to be
brought against persons of unknown address.
In the dispute at hand a German national and a Czech bank entered into a
mortgage loan contract. At the time when the contract was concluded, the
borrower was domiciled in the Czech Republic. The bank brought an action
against the borrower to pay to it a certain amount by way of arrears on the
mortgage loan before the ‘court with general jurisdiction over the defendant’. The
court stated that the defendant was not staying at the address indicated in the
contract and that it was impossible to establish any other place of residence in the
Czech Republic. In application of the Czech Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
assigned a guardian ad litem to the defendant, who was considered to be a person
whose domicile was unknown.
bb) Main reasoning
With reference to Owusu232 the CJEU held that the application of Regulation 44/
2001 requires the existence of an international element that may derive from the
fact that the proceedings raise questions relating to the determination of interna-
tional jurisdiction. Such a situation arises in a case, in which an action is brought
before a court of a Member State against a national of another Member State
whose domicile is unknown to that court.233 Regulation 44/2001 does not contain
a provision which defines jurisdiction in a case where the domicile of the defen-
dant is unknown.234 Under Article 16(2) of the Regulation, consumer contract
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proceedings may be brought only in the courts of the Member State in which the
consumer is domiciled.235 Thus, firstly, the national court must determine whether
the defendant is domiciled in the Member State of that court by applying that
Member State’s own law (Article 59(1) of Regulation 44/2001).236 If this is to be
answered in the negative, it must examine whether the consumer is domiciled in
another Member State by applying the national law of the other Member State
(Article 59(2) of Regulation 44/2001).237 If this is neither the case, it has to be
ascertained whether there is evidence to support the conclusion that the defen-
dant is in fact domiciled outside the European Union, so that Article 4 of Regula-
tion 44/2001 is applicable. If this is also not the case, the national court may
consider the consumer’s last known domicile.238 The criterion of the consumer’s
last known domicile ‘ensures a fair balance between the rights of the applicant
and those of the defendant precisely in a case such as that in the main proceed-
ings, in which the defendant was under an obligation to inform the other party to
the contract of any change of address occurring after the long-term mortgage loan
contract had been signed’.239 With reference to Gambazzi240 the CJEU held that
fundamental rights, such as respect for the rights of the defence, do not constitute
unfettered prerogatives and may be subject to restrictions corresponding to the
objectives of public interest as avoiding situations of denial of justice.241 In order
to ensure the rights of the defence, Article 26(2) of Regulation 44/2001 requires
that a court having jurisdiction ‘may reasonably continue proceedings, in the case
where it has not been established that the defendant has been enabled to receive
the document instituting the proceedings, only if all necessary steps have been
taken to ensure that the defendant can defend his interests.’242 The court seised of
the matter must be satisfied that all investigations required by the principle of
good faith have been undertaken with diligence in order to trace the defendant.243
The restriction of the defendant’s rights of defence by the notification of the action
being served on a guardian ad litem is justified in the light of an applicant’s right
to effective protection.244
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cc) Integration in the case-law
In line with the opinion of Advocate-General Trstenjak, the CJEU answered in the
affirmative the applicability of the Regulation 44/2001 in cases in which the
defendant is a national of another Member State. As pointed out by Advocate-
General Trstenjak, although the Regulation takes no account of nationality, a
distinction must be drawn between the question of applicability of the Regulation
and the question of the jurisdiction of the courts.245 However, contrary to Advo-
cate-General Trstenjak, the CJEU sees no reason to answer the fourth question of
the national court, whether the international jurisdiction for the purposes of
Article 17(3) of Regulation 44/2001 can be established by an agreement on the
territorial jurisdiction. The Advocate-General explained that agreements on inter-
national jurisdiction can arise implicitly from agreements on territorial jurisdic-
tion where this is consistent with the intention of the parties.246 Only in so far as
the referring court is unable to base its jurisdiction on an agreement on interna-
tional jurisdiction, it will have to have regard for the requirements of Article 16(2)
of Regulation 44/2001.247 In this context the Advocate-General also explained that
the non-binding nature of an agreement on local jurisdiction by reason of unfair-
ness within the meaning of Articles 3(1) and 6 of Directive 93/13248 can affect the
validity of such an agreement on international jurisdiction only where this is the
intention of the parties.249
e) No requirement of a distance contract for the application of Article 15(1)(c)
Regulation 44/2001 (case 190/11Mühlleitner)
aa) Facts
The Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof asked the CJEU whether the application of
Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001 requires that a distance contract has been
concluded between the consumer and the undertaking.
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The consumer, who resides in Austria, purchased a motor vehicle from
Autohaus Yusufi, a motor vehicle retail business established in Hamburg (Ger-
many). The consumer found the offer on a German search platform in the internet.
The consumer went to Hamburg in order to sign the purchase contract and to take
possession of the vehicle. On her return to Austria she discovered that the vehicle
was defective. When the defendants refused to repair the vehicle, the consumer
brought proceedings before the Austrian court for rescission of the purchase
contract.
bb) Main reasoning
In accordance with Advocate-General Cruz Villalón the CJEU determines that
Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001 does not require that the contract between
the consumer and the undertaking has been concluded at a distance. The CJEU
referred to the wording of the provision which does not presuppose a contract
concluded at a distance but that the trader pursues commercial or professional
activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or directs such activities
to that Member State and that the contract at issue falls within the scope of its
activities.250 While Article 13 of the Brussels Convention required that the consu-
mer must have taken the necessary steps in the State of its domicile, Article 15(1)
(c) of Regulation 44/2001 is limited to conditions applicable to the trader alone.251
The CJEU emphasised further that the additional requirement of the conclusion of
the contract at a distance would, regarding a teleological interpretation, run
counter to the objective of that provision to ensure the protection of consumers as
the weaker parties to the contract.252 The referring court brought up the question
whether it can be inferred from paragraphs 86 and 87 of the judgment Pammer
and Hotel Alpenhof that Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001 is applicable only to
consumer contracts which have been concluded at a distance. The CJEU clarifies
that the Court in the paragraphs at issue merely dismissed the arguments of Hotel
Alpenhof GesmbH that the contract had not been concluded at a distance
because, on the facts, the hotel room had been reserved and the reservation
confirmed at a distance.253 The significance of the paragraphs at issue cannot be
extended beyond the particular circumstances of that case. The essential condi-
tion for the application of Article 15(1)(c) is that relating to a commercial or
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professional activity directed to the State of the consumer’s domicile. In that
respect, ‘both the establishment of contact at a distance, as in the present case,
and the reservation of goods or services at a distance, or a fortiori the conclusion
of a consumer contract at a distance, are indications that the contract is con-
nected with such an activity.’254
cc) Integration in the case-law
There had been no consensus in the German case-law and literature on the
question whether Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001 requires the conclusion of
a contract at a distance or not.255 As already proposed by Advocate-General
Trstenjak in Pammer and Alpenhof, the CJEU now clarified that a contract con-
cluded at a distance was not required.256 It is said that the decision of the CJEU
protects the active consumer who travels to another Member State to purchase a
good or to obtain a service.257
f) Clarification of the concepts ‘consumer’ in Article 15(1) and ‘matters
relating to a contract’ in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 44/2001
(case 419/11 Česká spořitelna)
aa) Facts
The Czech Městský soud v Praze asked the CJEU about the application of Articles
15(1) and 5(1)(a) of Regulation 44/2001 in the case of judicial proceedings by
which the payee of a promissory note brings claims under that note, which was
incomplete at the date of its signature and was subsequently completed by the
payee, against the giver of a guarantee, domiciled in another Member State.
The managing director of the entity Feichter-CZ s r o (‘the Borrower’) assumed
as an individual with the mention ‘per aval’ a guarantee for a promissory note
which was supposed to serve as guarantee for an overdraft agreement with the
Česká spořitelna (‘the Lender’). At the date of the signature the promissory note
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was not issued in completed form, but was, as agreed upon, completed later. The
note was presented at the due date at the place of payment but was not paid.
Consequently, the lender brought proceedings against the managing director
before the Prague Municipal Court. The managing director entered the objection
that the court did not have jurisdiction, given that he is resident in Austria.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU explained that the application of Article 15(1) of Regulation 44/2001
presupposes that a party to a contract is a consumer and that the contract falls
within one of the categories referred to in Article 15(1)(a) to (c).258 With regard to
the first condition, the CJEU established that the definition of the concept of
consumer within Regulation 44/2001 has the same scope as in Article 13 of the
Brussels Convention.259 As pointed out in Gruber260 and Benincasa261 only con-
tracts ‘concluded outside and independently of any trade or professional activity
or purpose, solely for the purpose of satisfying an individual’s own needs in terms
of private consumption’ are covered.262 With reference to the opinion of Advocate-
General Sharpston, the CJEU points out that this condition is not met, since the
guarantee of a natural person, given on a promissory note issued in order to
guarantee the obligations of a commercial company, cannot be regarded as
having been given outside of any trade or professional activity if that individual
has close professional or commercial links with that company, such as being its
managing director or majority shareholder.263 Under the circumstances of the case
the giver of the guarantee cannot be regarded as a consumer within the meaning
of Article 15(1) of Regulation 44/2001.264 With reference to its case-law relating to
Article 5(1)(1) of the Brussels Convention, the CJEU answered the question
whether the legal relationship between the payee of a promissory note and the
giver of a guarantee falls within the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’
within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 44/2001.265 By analogy with
Engler,266 the establishment of a legal obligation freely consented to by one person
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towards another and on which the action at issue is based is required.267 With
reference to the opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, the CJEU ruled that the
condition is satisfied since the giver of the guarantee, by signing the promissory
note on its face under the indication ‘per aval’, voluntarily consented to act as the
guarantor of the obligations of the maker of that promissory note.268 The fact that
that signature was made on a blank promissory note is not relevant since the giver
of the guarantee also signed the agreement on the right to complete the note.269
With regard to the concept of the ‘place of performance of the obligation’ within
the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of the Regulation, the CJEU ruled that the place of
performance of the obligation which was expressly indicated on the promissory
note has to be taken into account by the referring court, in so far as the applicable
law permits that choice of the place of performance of the obligation.270
cc) Integration in the case-law
Advocate-General Sharpston pointed out that the facts in the case at hand are a
‘perfect example’ of a guarantee obligation that is not covered by the provisions
relating to consumers of the Regulation.271 It cannot be assumed that the giver of
the guarantee is economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than
its co-contractor.272 The Advocate-General explained that even though the giver of
the guarantee is not a contracting party, the giving of the guarantee under the
promissory note still represents a legal obligation. The giver of the guarantee is
bound in the same manner as the borrower.273 Given that Article 5(1)(a) of the
Regulation 44/2001 must be interpreted independently, the Czech law, which
classifies a bill of exchange as an abstract security which does not have the
character of a contract, does not affect the position.274 The Czech court, in
particular, raised the issue whether the fact that the promissory note was blank
when issued and subsequently completed by the lender has any effect on the
position, since the possibility is given that the place of payment was inserted in
breach of the terms of the Supplemental Agreement or that that agreement was
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void for uncertainty or on other grounds.275 The CJEU ruled that the place of
performance had to be established taking into account only the information on
the promissory note. Even though there was no dispute as to the place of
performance, Advocate-General Sharpston explained for the contrary case that
the national court should first consider the defendant’s objection in that regard
and, if that objection is well founded, it should decline jurisdiction, unless there
are other substantiated grounds on which it might proceed to determine the case.
Next it should consider the ground on which the applicant bases his claim of
jurisdiction and, if that ground is unfounded, decline its jurisdiction. If the true
position is more difficult to ascertain, the court should accept jurisdiction when
the applicant has made out a prima facie case as regards the applicability of the
relevant provision of the Regulation.276
g) Requirement of a causal link between the directing of the commercial activity
and the conclusion of the contract (case 218/12 Emrek)
aa) Facts
The German Landgericht Saarbrücken referred to the CJEU the question whether
Article 15(1)(c) of the Regulation 44/2001 requires, as a ‘further unwritten condi-
tion’, that there is a causal link between the commercial activity ‘directed’ to the
Member State in which the consumer is domiciled and the decision of the
consumer for the conclusion of the contract.
In the dispute at hand, the consumer, who resides in Germany, concluded a
purchase contract for a second‑hand motor vehicle with a trader at the latter’s
business premises in France. The consumer learned from acquaintances, and not
from its Internet site, of the business of the trader. The consumer brought an
action before the German Amtsgericht Saarbrücken making claims under the
warranty. The Amtsgericht dismissed the claim as inadmissible holding that it
had no international jurisdiction. The defendant had not directed its professional
activity to the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled, which is
Germany. The consumer appealed. The German Landgericht Saarbrücken referred
to the case-law of the CJEU in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof and affirmed the
existence of the condition of a commercial activity of the defendant directed to
Germany. In particular, the mention of the French international dialling code and
in addition of a German mobile telephone number gives the impression that
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consumers residing in Germany shall be canvassed as clients. However, the CJEU
did not take any position relating to the requirement of a causal link between the
directing of the activity of the trader and the conclusion of the contract with the
consumer. In the view of the German Bundesgerichtshof, the condition that the
commercial activity is ‘directed’ to the Member State in which the consumer is
domiciled requires that the consumer was at least induced to enter into the
contract by the website, even if the conclusion of the contract itself did not take
place in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU pointed out that the requirement of a causal link cannot be derived from
the wording of Article 15(1)(c) of the Regulation 44/2001 nor from a teleological
interpretation of the provision in view of the aim of protecting consumers.277 In
particular, ‘difficulties related to proof of the existence of a causal link between
the means used to direct the activity, that is an Internet site, and the conclusion of
a contract, would tend to dissuade consumers from bringing actions before the
national courts under Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation No 44/2001 and would
weaken the protection of consumers which those provisions seek to achieve.’278
This is particularly the case if the contract was not concluded at a distance
through the site. However, a causal link may constitute strong evidence in the
assessment of whether the activity is in fact directed to the Member State in which
the consumer is domiciled.279 The situation of a trader established in one Member
State close to the border of another Member State, in an urban area extending on
both sides of the border, who uses a telephone number allocated by the other
Member State, may constitute evidence that his activity is ‘directed to’ that other
Member State. The final assessment of the circumstances is left to the referring
court.280
cc) Integration in the case-law
The preliminary reference of the German Landgericht Saarbrücken gave the
CJEU the opportunity to answer the question whether a causal link between the
directing of the commercial activity and the conclusion of the contract is
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required, which has been subject to discussions since its decision in Mühlleit-
ner.281
h) Concept of ‘the other party to a contract’ laid down in Article 16(1) of
Regulation No 44/2001 (case 478/12Maletic)
aa) Facts
The Austrian Landesgericht Feldkirch asked whether the concept of ‘the other
party to a contract’ laid down in Article 16(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 covers the
contracting partner (here, a travel agent having its seat abroad) of the travel
operator with which the consumer concluded that contract, which has its regis-
tered office in the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled.
In the dispute, the Maletics domiciled in Bludesch (Austria) booked a pack-
age holiday on the website of a travel agent established in Munich (Germany),
while the trip was to be operated by an Austrian company having its registered
office in Vienna (Austria). Because of a booking mistake, the consumers had to
pay a surcharge upon arrival at the hotel. In order to recover the surcharge paid
and to be compensated for the inconvenience, they initiated an action before the
Bezirksgericht Bludenz seeking payment from the travel agent and the operator.
The national court dismissed the action in as far as it was brought against the
operator on the ground that it lacked local jurisdiction. It held that Regulation
No 44/2001 was not applicable and that according to domestic law, the courts in
Vienna have jurisdiction.
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bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU held that the concept of ‘other party to the contract’ laid down in Ar-
ticle 16(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 covers the contracting partner of the operator
with which the consumer concluded that contract and which has its registered
office in the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled. In line with the
objectives of Regulation 44/2001 to protect the consumer and to avoid concurrent
proceedings, the second contractual relationship with the travel operator cannot
be classified as ‘purely’ domestic since it was inseparably linked to the first
contractual relationship which was made through the travel agency situated in
another Member State.282 Indeed, ‘those objectives preclude a solution which
allows the Maletics to pursue parallel proceedings in Bludenz and Vienna, by way
of connected actions against two operators involved in the booking and the
arrangements for the package holiday.’283
cc) Integration in the case-law
The judgment of the CJEU aims for a high level of consumer protection. However,
the reasoning of the Court is subject to criticism. In particular, the question
remains open whether the outcome would be different in case the consumer
decides to bring an action only against the operator and not the travel agent or
when the travel agent is situated in a third country. Also, it is uncertain on what
basis the relationship between the consumer and the travel agent can be classi-
fied as contractual.284
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2 Alternative dispute settlement (case 317/08 Alassini)
a) Compatibility of a mandatory settlement procedure with the principle of
effective judicial protection (case 317/08 Alassini)
aa) Facts
In the reference for a preliminary ruling of the Italian Giudice di pace di Ischia the
CJEU answered the question whether Article 34 of the Directive 2002/22/EC285 and
the principle of effective judicial protection preclude national legislation under
which the admissibility before the courts of actions relating to electronic commu-
nications services between end-users and providers is conditional upon an
attempt to settle the dispute out of court.
In the dispute the applicants claimed compensation from their providers of
telecommunications services for damages they allegedly suffered as a result of a
breach of their telephone contracts. The telephone companies claimed that the
actions are inadmissible since the applicants did not first attempt a mandatory
out-of-court settlement of the dispute.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU ruled that Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive does not preclude
national legislation under which the admissibility before the courts of actions
relating to consumer contracts is conditional upon an attempt to settle the dispute
out of court. The procedures referred to by the Universal Service Directive for
dealing with disputes must not merely involve an attempt to bring the parties
together to convince them to find a solution by common consent, but must lead to
the settling of the dispute through the active intervention of a third party who
proposes or imposes a solution.286 In accordance with recital 47 in the preamble
to the Directive, when making available the procedures referred to in that Direc-
tive for dealing with disputes, Member States should take due account of Recom-
mendation 98/257.287, 288 Since neither Article 34 of the Directive nor the Recom-
mendation 98/257 make more detailed provision as regards the precise content or
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the nature of the out-of-court procedures, it is for the Member States to define the
nature of those procedures.289 The CJEU emphasised that national legislation,
which ensures that out-of-court procedures are systematically used for settling
disputes, does not compromise but rather strengthens the effectiveness of the
Universal Service Directive.290
Under the principle of effectiveness, the mandatory settlement procedure at
issue is not such as to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to
exercise the rights which individuals derive from the Universal Service Direc-
tive.291 The following aspects are decisive: (1) The outcome of the settlement
procedure is not binding on the parties concerned and thus does not prejudice
their right to bring legal proceedings;292 (2) There is no substantial delay for the
purposes of bringing legal proceedings since the parties may bring legal proceed-
ings after the expiry of a 30-day time-limit;293 (3) For the duration of the settlement
procedure, the period for the time-barring of claims is suspended;294 (4) There are
no significant fees for the settlement procedure;295 (5) In order to not render the
exercise of rights in practice impossible or excessively difficult for certain indivi-
duals, in particular, those without access to the Internet, the access to the settle-
ment procedure cannot be possible only by electronic means;296 (6) In exceptional
cases it must be possible to adopt interim measures.297
The mandatory attempt of a settlement introduces an additional step for
access to the courts, which might prejudice the principle of effective judicial
protection, in particular Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.298 Under
the above mentioned aspects the imposition of an out-of-court settlement proce-
dure is not disproportionate in relation to the pursued objectives of a quicker and
less expensive settlement of disputes and a lightening of the burden on the court
system.299 As pointed out by Advocate-General Kokott, the introduction of an out-
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289 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 44.
290 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 45.
291 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 53.
292 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 54.
293 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 55.
294 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 56.
295 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 57.
296 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 58.
297 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 59.
298 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 62.
299 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraphs 64–65.
of-court settlement procedure which is merely optional is not as efficient as a
mandatory one.300
cc) Integration in the case-law
It is considered that Alassini implies a significant upgrading of the out-of-court
settlement procedures within the EU.301 The CJEU has assigned the seven mini-
mum requirements in the Recommendation 98/257/EC (impartiality, transpar-
ency, adversarial principle, efficiency, principle of legality, principle of liberty,
principle of representation) a ‘quasi binding character’ for mandatory settlement
procedures.302 The decision has effects for all sector-specific legislation which
provide for the promotion and implementation of settlement procedures by the
Member States.303 In view of the fragmented stock of EU-law provisions at the
moment of the Alassini-decision, comprehensive ‘horizontal’ legislation was to be
welcomed.304 Regulation 524/2013305 on online dispute resolution for consumer
disputes and Directive 2013/11/EU306 on alternative dispute resolution for consu-
mer disputes have been published in the Official Journal on 18 June 2013. Both
legislative instruments establish a completely new level of enforcement with an
unclear scope. Directive 2013/11/EU classifies the previous non-binding Recom-
mendation 98/257 with its quasi binding character after Alassini as definitively
binding.
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300 Joined cases 317–320/08, n 153 above, paragraph 65; AG Kokott, opinion of 19 November
2009 – case 317/08, n 153 above, paragraph 47.
301 N. Reich, Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2012).
302 H.-W. Micklitz, Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des Verbrau-
cherrechts? Gutachten A zum 69. Juristentag (Munich: C H Beck, 2012) A 94.
303 As, inter alia, in the Energy Directives 2009/72–73/EC (art 3(13) and art 3(9)), Telecommuni-
cation Directive 2009/134/EC (art 34), Postal Services Directive 2008/6/EC (art 19(6)) and in all
financial service areas, as eg in theMIFID-Directive 2004/39 (art 53(1)).
304 Reich, n 301 above.
305 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013
on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004
and Directive 2009/22/EC,OJEC 2013 L165/1.
306 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/
2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC,OJEC 2013 L165/63.
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